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Your Digital Footprint Left Behind at Death: An 
Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind 
Sandi S. Varnado∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
“Death in the digital age is a lot more complicated than it used to 
be.”1 Americans spend a substantial portion of their waking hours on 
some sort of electronic device, with a large amount of that time spent 
online.2 Recent studies reveal that an estimated 85% of American 
adults use the Internet3 and spend an average of 23 hours a week (or 
14% of the time available in a week) online.4 The figures are even 
higher for young American adults. Ninety-eight percent of 18 to 29 
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 1. Patrick Marshall, Digital Estate Planning Often Forgotten, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 7, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/20171 
71847_pfdigitalestates08.html [http://perma.cc/T8GQ-U5PH] (archived Mar. 4, 
2014). 
 2. One recent article indicates that Americans spend more than 28 hours per 
month on the Internet on a computer, nearly 6 hours on online videos, more than 5 
hours on mobile videos, and nearly 6 1/2 hours on a gaming console. Sarah Perez, 
Nielsen: TV Still King in Media Consumption; Only 16 Percent Of TV Homes Have 
Tablets, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://techcrunch .com/2013/01/07/nielsen-tv-
still-king-in-media-consumption-only-16-percent-of-tv-homes-have-tablets/ [http: 
//perma.cc/3VKB-RDDQ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). A different study notes that 
American adults spend a little more than 5 hours per day on digital media. Alexis 
Kleinman, Americans Will Spend More Time on Digital Devices Than Watching TV 
This Year: Research, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2013/08/01/tv-digital-devices_n_3691196.html [http://perma.cc/474A-U3ZV] 
(archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 3. Internet Use Over Time, PEW INTERNET, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-
trend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [http://perma 
.cc/QA4M-VDCP] (archived Mar. 12, 2014). Close to 300 million total Americans 
use the Internet. Chelsea Ray, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: A Proposal for Handling 
Digital Assets After Death, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 583, 586 (2013) (putting 
the number at 289,309,000). 
 4. David Mielach, Americans Spend 23 Hours Per Week Online, Texting, BUS. 
NEWS DAILY (Jul. 2, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4718-
weekly-online-social-media-time.html [http://perma.cc/3B2U-5ACX] (archived Feb. 
24, 2014). See also Jamie P. Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital 
Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209, 217 (2013) (stating that the average U.S. 
internet user spends almost 68 hours per month online). 
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year olds and 92% of 30 to 49 year olds use the Internet.5 More than 
75% of Internet users check their e-mail, texts, Facebook, and 
Instagram every day.6 Almost inadvertently, America has begun to 
lean more and more toward a predominantly digital culture,7 and many 
predict that this trend is going to continue.8 This interaction with 
computers9 has impacted American society and the law, and in many 
circumstances, the law, still set in the pen and ink era, simply fails to 
                                                                                                             
 5. Internet Use Over Time, supra note 3. Although recent studies show that 
92% of Americans have an online presence by the time they are two years old, Maria 
Perrone, Comment, What Happens When We Die: Estate Planning of Digital Assets, 
21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 185, 185 (2012), those over the age of 65 are a fast-
growing population of online users. Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital 
Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 NAELA J. 135, 136 (2013) [hereinafter Beyer 
& Cahn, Digital Planning]. The latter group also spends more money on technology 
and online shopping than any other demographic. David Goldman & Charles 
Jamison, The Future of Estate Planning: The Multigenerational Life Plan, 5 EST. 
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (2012). 
 6. Mielach, supra note 4. 
 7. EVAN CARROLL & JOHN ROMANO, YOUR DIGITAL AFTERLIFE: WHEN 
FACEBOOK, FLICKR AND TWITTER ARE YOUR ESTATE, WHAT’S YOUR LEGACY? 2 
(2011). 
 8. Frank S. Baldino, Estate Planning and Administration for Digital Assets, 
MD. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 28, 29; Tom H. Cantrill, Jean Gordon Carter, J. William 
Gray, Jr., Katherine E. Ramsey & Michael Anderson, Tweeting from Beyond: What 
Happens to Your Digital Assets When You Are Gone?, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=073d2e08-93c2-414e-acee-144bc 
058bef1 [http://perma.cc/WD9V-VNML] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (“[W]ith each 
passing year more of your life goes digital and in increasingly complex ways.”); John 
Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s 
Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 314−15 
(2011) (after providing statistics from 2010, claiming that “[p]erhaps the most 
interesting thing about these numbers is that they continue to grow, and the pace at 
which they are growing has not even begun to decline”).  
 9. In the interest of brevity, this Article uses the term “computer” in the 
vernacular sense here and throughout the rest of the Article. From here forward, this 
term shall include desktop computers, laptop computers, tablets, and smartphones, as 
well as storage hardware like external hard drives, and computer media like CDs, 
DVDs, flash drives, etc. 
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keep pace with technology.10 Such is the case with regard to one’s 
digital footprint at death.11 
A “digital footprint,” for purposes of this Article, is broadly 
defined to collectively include any and all files and accounts, whether 
stored locally or online.12 This includes any digital item such as a 
person’s digital information, digital assets, digital accounts, and digital 
estate.13 Digital items may simply be the means by which to access 
                                                                                                             
 10. Noam Kutler, Protecting Your Online You: A New Approach to Handling Your 
Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1641, 1651 (2011) (“The use of 
the Internet has exploded in recent years, leaving the law to catch up with many new 
issues.”); Gerry W. Beyer, Estate Planning in the Digital Age 1 (2013) (working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166422 (“[T]he pace of technology is faster than 
the law can adapt.”); Stephen S. Wu, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Data 
When You Die? 4 (2013), available at http://dataedge.ischool.berkeley.edu/2013 
/pdf/digital-afterlife-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UBU-S7FS] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014) (“Technology is always far ahead of the progress of the law . . . .”). 
 11. Rachel Ehrenberg, Computer Scientists Grapple with How to Manage the 
Digital Legacy of the Departed, SCIENCENEWS (June 10, 2013, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/350909/description/Computer_scientists 
_grapple_with_how_to_manage_the_digital_legacy_of_the_departed [http://perma 
.cc/EB44-MHJC] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (“But communication and privacy laws have 
yet to catch up with technology.”); CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 57 (“[O]ur 
cultural and legal mechanisms for passing along assets haven’t changed to include 
digital assets.”). Of course, this issue is not limited to America. See, e.g., Tobi Cohen, 
Lawyers Raise Questions About Digital Data Rights After the Owner’s Death, 
CANADA.COM (Aug. 20, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://o.canada.com/news/national/lawyers-
raise-questions-about-digital-data-rights-after-the-owners-death/ [http://perma.cc 
/EZ5G-9XSK] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing the issue from a Canadian 
perspective); Gerry W. Beyer, Who Gets Access to Your Facebook When You Die?, 
WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF BLOG (Aug. 20, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/trusts_estates_prof/2013/08/who-gets-access-to-your-facebook-when-you-die.html 
[http://perma.cc/8A4G-M6HG] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing Asia and 
Europe). 
 12. I have chosen the term “digital footprint” purposefully and defined it herein 
to avoid inadvertently narrowing the scope of this Article by the use of such terms as 
“digital information,” “digital asset,” “digital account,” or “digital estate.” 
 13. “Digital information” has been defined as “representative of (or enables 
control over) traditional forms of intangible personal property such as bank and 
brokerage accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other intangible investments for 
which the record-keeping, reporting or management functions are online, either in 
part or in whole.” Christopher D. Fidler, Tools for Digital Assets and Digital 
Information, LEXOLOGY (June 5, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail 
.aspx?g=00651ac6-d3b0-480a-adf8-a73f868f7eab [http://perma.cc/9HT2-PCNA] 
(archived Feb. 24, 2014). As commentators have recognized, there is no current 
definition of “digital assets” that is clear and universal. Conner, supra note 8, at 303; 
Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: 
Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. 
REV. 185, 207 (2012) (noting that the term “is already vague” and “is continuously 
broadening to incorporate once-tangible assets now undergoing complete digitization, 
as well as previously unforeseen cyber innovations”); Perrone, supra note 5, at 188 
(explaining that there is no universal definition of the term); Beyer, supra note 10 
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other digital items, like e-mail, for example, or they may be collections 
(of photographs, videos, documents, books, music, or other things), 
social media accounts, or other materials that are not valuable per se 
but are irreplaceable from a sentimental standpoint. Digital items may 
be financial in nature from a personal or business standpoint. Although 
one may not realize or appreciate the value of his digital footprint, it 
could comprise a significant portion of his entire patrimony. In fact, a 
recent study showed that the average American values his digital 
footprint at nearly $55,000.14 Digital items can also be quite unusual, 
such as the $17,000 virtual sword used in an online game.15 
                                                                                                             
 
(noting that there is no well-established definition). Further, others have offered 
different definitions of the term, with varying scope in each. See, e.g., Gerry W. 
Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass On, Don’t Leave The Passwords Behind, 
PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 2012, at 3 [hereinafter Beyer & Cahn, When You Pass On]; 
Tim Grant, ‘Digital Assets’: The New Frontier for Estate Planning, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (May 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/busi 
ness/legal/digital-assets-the-new-frontier-for-estate-planning-687401 [http://perma 
.cc/4G8Y-Y845] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital assets” as “any work or 
possessions stored on a computer and the Internet”); Rochelle L. Haller, Web of 
Estate Planning Considerations for Digital Assets, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c301f729-258b-42a4-bf8b-673b2 
30a0698 [http://perma.cc/Y6EL-QCKF] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital 
assets” as “electronic content; information or media; and the right to use that content, 
information, or media”); Fidler, supra (defining “interests in property capable of 
being divided or distributed, such as digital media in the form of text, photograph, 
music, and video files, websites and domain names, and to the extent legal ownership 
can be established, web-based media including e-mail accounts, social media and 
blogs”); Evan Carroll et al., Digital Assets: A Clearer Definition, DIGITAL EST. 
RESOURCE (Jan. 30, 2012), http://commcns.org/13IjiL5 [http://perma.cc/9HMZ-
Z92M] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (defining “digital assets” as the actual files stored in 
digital form). “Digital account” has been defined as access rights to digital accounts. 
Id. “Digital estate” has been defined as a person’s collective digital assets. Conner, 
supra note 8, at 305. See also Perrone, supra note 5, at 186 (defining “digital estate” 
as the culmination of digital assets). The term “digital footprint” is obviously broader 
than “digital information.” It is also broader than “digital asset,” although the two are 
similar, particularly when comparing the broadest definition of the former. It is 
roughly equivalent to “digital estate” except that the latter’s incorporation of the term 
“digital asset” in its definition generates scope issues. The intent in using “digital 
footprint” and the definition provided for it is to include all items that would also 
qualify under the definitions of “digital information,” “digital asset,” “digital 
account,” and “digital estate.” 
 14. Steven Maimes, Managing Your Digital Afterlife: Cyber Footprint, 
Ownership, and Access, TRUST ADVISOR (Jan. 28, 2013), http://thetrustadvisor 
.com/tag/digital-estate-planning [http://perma.cc/5BW3-QLWJ] (archived Mar. 4, 
2014). American Internet users have more digital items than the average world user. 
Hopkins, supra note 4, at 221. 
 15. Arden Dale, More Estate Plans Account for ‘Digital Assets’, WALL ST. J. 
(June 13, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873237 
34304578543151391292038.html. 
2014] DIGITAL FOOTPRINT 723 
 
 
 
A recent survey indicates that a majority of Americans have not 
planned for their digital footprints upon death.16 For most people, 
doing so is “a forgotten and neglected death-related obligation.”17 Even 
for those who are aware of and remember the issue, there are other 
reasons for their lack of planning. Some are nervous about the idea of 
sharing all of their log-in information prior to death.18 Some do not 
value their digital items enough to incorporate them into an estate 
plan.19 For others, “[t]he sheer magnitude of [their] digital lives can 
overwhelm [them] into inaction.”20 
The failure to include one’s digital footprint in an estate plan 
renders the plan incomplete. Lack of planning, in turn, means that 
one’s successors cannot know with any certainty what the decedent 
would have wanted to happen to his digital footprint, which could 
leave digital items “adrift in cyberspace.”21 The interests of various 
groups of people lead to competing policies about whether access to a 
                                                                                                             
 16. Catey Hill, 5 Steps to Creating Your Digital Estate Plan, NEXTAVENUE (Apr. 
12, 2013), http://www.nextavenue.org/article/2012-05/5-steps-creating-your-digital-
estate-plan [http://perma.cc/6NTY-D93U] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (stating that 63% 
have not made a plan for their digital footprint); Goldman & Jamison, supra note 5, at 
11 (stating that 57% have not). Some polls indicate that this number is slightly 
smaller for “high-net-worth people.” Paul Sullivan, Leaving Behind the Digital Keys 
to Financial Lives, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/05/25/your-money/forgotten-in-estate-planning-online-passwords.html?nl=todays 
headlines&emc=edit_th_20130525&_r=2& [http://perma.cc/45HU-SM5K] (archived 
Feb. 24, 2014). For that matter, most Americans do not plan for their death at all. The 
majority of Americans have not executed a will. Grant, supra note 13 (claiming that 
61% of Americans have not made a will at their death); Sherry, supra note 13, at 207 
(claiming the number is 58%). 
 17. Maimes, supra note 14. See also Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 
5, at 149 (explaining that many clients have never considered estate planning for their 
digital footprints); Conner, supra note 8, at 308 (“People simply do not think about 
their digital assets . . . .”). 
 18. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 150; Sullivan, supra note 
16. 
 19. Michael Walker & Victoria D. Blachly, Virtual Assets, ST0003 ALI-ABA 
175, 177 (2011). 
 20. Rev. Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, What Does Managing a Loved One’s 
Digital Legacy Look Like?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2013, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-amy-ziettlow/what-does-managing-a-love_b 
_3461477.html [http://perma.cc/3LR3-2D3P] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). See also 
Perrone, supra note 5, at 194 (“[T]he sheer amount of work involved in tracking 
every online account and password presents a task that many people consider too 
daunting to undertake.”); Ehrenberg, supra note 11. 
 21.  Ray, supra note 3, at 583. See also Samantha Haworth, Laying Your Online 
Self to Rest: Evaluating the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, U. 
MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2269093 (“When internet users die without planning for their digital 
lives, families and estate executors are left to guess the users’ wishes.”). 
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decedent’s digital footprint should be allowed or denied.22 The law 
does not help. Louisiana, like most states, has no specific legislation in 
place to govern a decedent’s digital footprint, leaving traditional legal 
principles to govern technological advancements that did not exist and 
were probably not even anticipated at the time the laws in question 
were written. Thus far, the problems have not reached epic proportions, 
but that day is coming. As more transactions occur online, fewer hard 
copies exist. Instead, the “[d]ocuments once found in wallets, desks, 
and safety deposit boxes are now accessed mainly through email and 
website accounts.”23 And as environmental consciousness finds its way 
more and more into corporate America and more customers are 
encouraged to opt for paperless transactions, digital items will continue 
to grow in number and value.24 As that happens and as the most 
prolific users of online services start to die in greater numbers,25 the 
digital footprint issue will become a serious problem. 
With this background in mind, this Article is organized as follows: 
Part I provides an overview of some of the most common digital items, 
including e-mail, sentimental items (like collections of photographs, 
videos, documents, books, and music, as well as social media 
accounts), and financial digital items. Part II assesses the various 
interests triggered by the digital footprint issue. One such interest is 
efficient estate administration, which could affect a decedent’s 
succession representative,26 his successors, and in certain 
                                                                                                             
 22. Competing interests include (1) efficient estate administration (which affects 
decedents’ succession representatives, their successors, and in some situations, their 
donees and the donees’ successors by gratuitous title), (2) the privacy interests (of 
decedents and those with whom they communicated), (3) the right to information of 
those left behind (in some situations), (4) the contractual rights of online service 
providers, and (5) the historical preservation interests of society. See infra Part II. 
 23. Molly Wilkens, Comment, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After 
Death: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1039 (2011). 
 24. Grant, supra note 13; David H. Ogwyn, Digital Asset Protection and 
Planning, LA. B.J., Oct./Nov. 2012, at 208, 209 (“Service providers, including banks, 
insurance companies, and various utility agencies, encourage their customers to 
switch to paperless statements and online account management.”). 
 25. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1644 (“[G]iven the relatively young age of the 
average internet user, many questions regarding death and rights of succession have 
yet to reach the critical mass necessary to garner public attention—but they will 
soon.”); Sherry, supra note 13, at 213 (“[N]ot enough people—especially the young 
and the will-less—have died to call attention to the questions raised by dead persons’ 
unnamed social-media accounts.”). 
 26. This Article uses the term “succession representative” to connote the person 
who is in charge of administering the decedent’s estate. See generally LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 2826 (2014). Generally, in Louisiana, that person is an executor named by 
the decedent in his testament, and in other cases, an administrator. See generally 
FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS § 5.8, in 1A 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 103–08 (2005). 
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circumstances in Louisiana, his donees and their successors by 
gratuitous title. Yet the privacy interests of the decedent and those with 
whom he communicated must be considered as well, along with the 
interests of those left behind. Also interested in the issue are the online 
service providers (OSPs) that contracted with the decedent when he 
created certain digital assets in his digital footprint, as well as society, 
which has an interest in the decedent’s digital footprint from a 
historical preservation standpoint. Some of these interests weigh in 
favor of allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint; others do not. 
Part III addresses the Gordian knot of overlapping and complicated 
legal analyses that the digital footprint issue triggers, including (1) the 
status of some or all digital items as property, such that they may be 
transferred at death; (2) the effect of the OSPs’27 terms of service 
(TOS)28 on the transfer of and access to certain digital items; and (3) 
the effect of certain federal privacy statutes. Part IV details the 
Louisiana approach to the digital footprint issue, which is, as of now, 
only estate planning. Louisiana, like the majority of other states,29 has 
no legislation or jurisprudence to specifically address the digital 
footprint issue. Part V analyzes the various potential resolutions to the 
issue (including company policy change, ad hoc judicial action, a 
federal statute, a state statute, and a uniform act), and it highlights the 
deficiencies of each. Finally, Part VI proposes that both federal and 
state action is required to effectively handle the multitude of legal 
issues triggered by the digital footprint. On the federal level, it suggests 
that Congress (1) amend existing federal statutes to ensure that one 
accessing a decedent’s digital footprint is not unintentionally breaking 
the law and (2) enact a federal enabling statute to mandate that OSPs 
follow the digital footprint laws of the states. On the state level, Part VI 
                                                                                                             
 27. “Each online service provider has its own terms of service—the legal 
mumbo-jumbo you click through when you open your account . . . .” Eleanor Laise, 
Protect Digital Assets After Your Death, KIPLINGER (May 2013), http://www 
.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T021-C000-S004-protect-digital-as sets-after-your-
death.html [http://perma.cc/7ZX4-A3LW] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). The TOS always 
exist and vary from provider to provider, making it nearly impossible for one with a 
large digital footprint to know his rights. Perrone, supra note 5, at 190; Kutler, supra 
note 10, at 1648–49. Also, many sites unilaterally amend their terms on a regular 
basis, creating quite a burden for a user who tries to stay abreast of his rights. Id. 
 28. They are also sometimes referred to as “clickwrap agreements,” Beyer & 
Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 37, or “browsewrap agreements,” Kutler, 
supra note 10, at 1646. 
 29. Grant, supra note 13. See also Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-Line, PROB. 
& PROP., July/Aug. (2011), at 36, 37–38; Nicole Schneider, Social Media Wills—
Protecting Digital Assets, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June 2013, at 16, 16 (“Currently, there 
exists almost no legally binding precedent for including digital assets as part of an 
estate without explicit directions in a will or trust.”); Haworth, supra note 21, at 6 
(“Reported case law on how these different types of digital assets are being accessed 
and distributed through the probate system is nearly nonexistent at this time.”). 
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offers a detailed statutory scheme to govern the digital footprints of 
both testate and intestate decedents. Ultimately, it suggests that 
Louisiana should avoid the “one-size-fits-all” approach to the digital 
footprint issue followed in existing legislation in other states and in the 
draft of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act. Instead, it 
suggests that Louisiana consider the strength of interests triggered by 
different digital items and enact legislation that appropriately reflects 
that consideration by treating each digital item differently. 
I. DIGITAL ITEMS IN A DIGITAL FOOTPRINT 
Because one’s digital footprint is defined so broadly, one 
commentator aptly noted that its scope is “utterly mindboggling.”30 
Digital items can be stored locally or online or both. Some, like e-mail, 
can be used to access other digital items. Some hold sentimental value, 
while others are better classified as financial in nature.31 
A. The Digital Item Used to Access Other Digital Items: E-mail 
Accounts 
E-mail, a unique and personal identifier, is, of course, in digital 
form itself. Americans now use their e-mail accounts in a variety of 
ways, including the traditional way of communicating with others. Yet, 
an e-mail account also serves as the means to reset passwords to other 
online accounts, and thus, it is an important index of most online 
activity.32 As a result, one’s e-mail account has been referred to as the 
master key to locating and accessing many other digital items.33 After 
all, “[o]nline statements, notifications, messages, paperless bills etc., 
will all come through to the decedent’s emails. Moreover, the 
decedent’s address book and calendar are often tied to or stored within 
the email account.”34 Therefore, access to a decedent’s e-mail account 
is extremely important. Without it, a succession representative may be 
                                                                                                             
 30. Ray, supra note 3, at 586. See also Beyer, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that the 
number of digital items one person owns or controls is “virtually endless”). 
 31. Note that this classification scheme is not an exact science because—as will 
become obvious—some digital items arguably belong in more than one category. 
Note also that other legal scholars have grouped them differently. Some have grouped 
them as “personal, social media, financial, and business.” See Cahn, supra note 29. 
Others have grouped them as stored locally or stored elsewhere and then included 
sub-groups within each group. See Sherry, supra note 13, at 195. 
 32. Carroll et al., supra note 13. 
 33. Maimes, supra note 14; Sherry, supra note 13, at 196. 
 34. Neeli G. Shah, Disposition of Digital Assets: Reasons for Digital Estate 
Planning, LEXOLOGY (May 8, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail 
.aspx?g=220d8c0f-b689-4bbf-95bf-67a1ad741c14 [http://perma.cc/9GSS-WCC8] 
(archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
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unable to obtain information about a decedent’s other digital items, 
which may, in turn, mean that the succession representative will be 
unaware of their existence.35 
Trillions of e-mails are sent each year,36 and billions are sent 
daily.37 Seventy-five percent of working American adults have at least 
one personal e-mail address, and 59% have at least one work e-mail 
address.38 Although some e-mail programs are local, many of the most 
popular e-mail services, like Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo!,39 are web-
based, meaning that copies of the e-mails are not downloaded onto the 
computer and the content in the accounts is accessible only through the 
accounts themselves.40 
B. Digital Items of Sentimental Value: Collections and Social Media 
Accounts  
An e-mail account can also be used to unlock one’s sentimental 
digital assets, including collections of photographs and videos, 
documents, books, music, and other collections that can be stored 
either on a computer or through an online account. It can also be used 
to unlock social media accounts (on which people can also store other 
digital items).41 All of these digital items may be valuable to a 
decedent’s survivors, even if only in the sentimental sense. As one 
industry expert explained: “If you’ve lost someone, you cling to 
                                                                                                             
 35. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1054. 
 36. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 220. 
 37. Sherry, supra note 13, at 186; CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 38. 
 38. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. Twenty percent of young adults have three 
or more e-mail accounts. Id. 
 39.  
There are no uniform statistics comparing the user numbers of the 
different web-based email address providers. Nevertheless, there is 
enough information available to make some statements about the 
popularity of different services. The big three are Microsoft’s Hotmail 
(now called Windows Live Hotmail), Yahoo! Mail and Gmail, together 
accounting for well over 1 billion users. 
Mark Brownlow, Email and Webmail Statistics, EMAIL MARKETING REP. (Dec. 
2012), http://www.email-marketing-reports.com/metrics/email-statistics.htm [http: 
//perma.cc/FF49-S8T8] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Although the providers claim 
higher numbers, a Comscore study indicates that Gmail has 288 million users, 
Hotmail, 286 million, and Yahoo! mail, 282 million. Id. 
 40. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. 
 41. By way of example, there are more than 250 million photographs uploaded to 
Facebook each day. Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 
1647 (2012) [hereinafter Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife]. 
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everything they may have had. You realize that even the most 
pedestrian items become very meaningful after someone is gone.”42 
Seemingly gone are the days when people would routinely print 
out photographs and save video cassette recorder tapes. Instead, many 
people store their photographs and videos solely in digital form,43 
either by saving them locally or online, often with websites such as 
Flickr,44 Shutterfly,45 Snapfish,46 Photobucket,47 or YouTube.48 Many 
                                                                                                             
 42. Maimes, supra note 14 (quoting Evan Carroll of THE DIGITAL BEYOND, 
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
Perrone, supra note 5, at 198 (explaining that “a person’s digital presence can, after 
death, provide meaning to those still living”). 
 43. Gerry W. Beyer & Kerri M. Griffin, Estate Planning for Digital Assets, EST. 
PLAN. STUD., July 2011, at 3, available at http://www.floridaprobatecounsel 
.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/Estate-Planning/Estate-Planning-For-Digital-Assets 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/67ZX-P56C] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (explaining that “[t]oday, 
this material [like special pictures, letters, and journals] is stored on computers or 
online and is often never printed”); Tyler G. Tarney, Comment, A Call for Legislation 
to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 777 (2012) 
(“As the world becomes more dependent on technology, it is becoming more likely 
that the only copies of these pictures remain within password-protected accounts.”); 
Sherry, supra note 13, at 203 (“Notably, cloud services like Flickr and Snapfish mean 
that companies like Yahoo! often become the sole home for many people’s photos.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 44. “Flickr, founded in 2004 and owned by Yahoo!, claims to be the largest 
photo-sharing site on the internet.” Sherry, supra note 13, at 202. Flickr hosts 
approximately 87 million users and 8 billion images. Craig Smith, How Many People 
Use 378 of the Top Social Media, Apps & Tools? (February 2014), DIGITAL 
MARKETING RAMBLINGS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.expandedramblings.com 
/index.php/resource-how-many-people-use-the-top-social-media/ [http://perma.cc 
/W5YU-9H5Y] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 45. Shutterfly has 35 million users and 18 billion photos on its site. Here’s How 
We Think of Shutterfly’s Stock Value, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 1, 2013, 5:40 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1241641-heres-how-we-think-of-shutterflys-stock-
value [http://perma.cc/9WZA-D3CK] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). In 2012, billions of 
Kodak Gallery photos were moved to Shutterfly when Kodak closed the gallery. Id. 
 46. Snapfish was formed in 2000, CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 28, and 
now claims 90 million users and 2 billion photos. Welcome, SNAPFISH, 
http://www.snapfish.com/snapfish/aboutUs (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma 
.cc/YEA5-HR4R] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 47. Photobucket claims 23 million monthly American users who upload more 
than 4 million images and videos each day. About Photobucket, PHOTOBUCKET, 
http://photobucket.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/A2WK-
3DB4] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). 
 48. YouTube was founded in 2005 as a video-sharing site, Sherry, supra note 13, 
at 203, and today there are approximately 1 billion users each month, Statistics, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013) [http://perma.cc/WDV5-PU29] (archived Feb. 24, 2014), and 120 billion 
videos on YouTube. Maimes, supra note 14. More than 800 million users access the 
site every month, Hopkins, supra note 4, at 218, and two-thirds of all Internet users 
check YouTube daily. Mielach, supra note 4. Users upload numerous hours of video 
every minute. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1666 (putting the 
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also store and share various types of documents in digital form, either 
locally or online through Google Docs,49 Scribd,50 or Dropbox.51 
Computers and online accounts also hold various types of collections 
in digital form. For example, many have virtual libraries on a Nook or 
Kindle52 and music on iTunes53 or Pandora.54 
Social media accounts may also be classified as sentimental digital 
items. Some claim that these accounts have replaced diaries,55 despite 
the fact that social media involves interactions with others.56 
Americans have fervently embraced social networking in the past 
decade57 and now spend about 16 minutes of every hour online on this 
                                                                                                             
 
number at 60 hours every minute); Sherry, supra note 13 (putting the number at 48 
every minute); Hopkins, supra note 4, at 218 (putting the number at 24 every minute). 
YouTube is an excellent example of the overlapping nature of these categories, as 
first mentioned supra note 31. While YouTube is classified herein as a digital item of 
a sentimental nature, it can be financially valuable under the YouTube Partner 
Program. Sherry, supra note 13, at 203. Per this program, “YouTube runs 
advertisements across partners’ videos or makes them available for rent, then gives 
the ‘majority’ of the ad-generated money to the partners.” Id. at 203. 
 49. All Gmail users have access to GoogleDocs. See supra note 39 for the 
number of Gmail users. 
 50. Scribd has approximately 80 million monthly users. About Us, SCRIBD, 
http://www.scribd.com/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/97R2-
7JHR] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 51. Dropbox has more than 200 million users. What is Dropbox?, 
DROPBOX.COM, https://www.dropbox.com/news/company-info (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013) [http://perma.cc/P483-VDMJ] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 52. Kindle has 17.4 million active users just in the United States. 17.4 Million 
Active Kindle Fire Users in US, 30.5 Million Active iPad Users, NEWZOO (Apr. 19, 
2012), http://www.newzoo.com/press-releases/17-4-million-active-kindle-fire-users-in-
us-30-5-million-active-ipad-users/ [http://perma.cc/6SPC-PLRP] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 53. iTunes claims 575 million users. Daniel Eran Dilger, Apple Now Adding 
500,000 New iTunes Accounts Per Day, APPLE INSIDER (June 13, 2013, 9:48 PM), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/06/14/apple-now-adding-500000-new-itunes-
accounts-per-day [http://perma.cc/K36Y-FMKP] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 54. Pandora has more than 71 million users. Ryan Faughnder, Pandora Reports 
2nd-Quarter Sales Growth, Will End Listening Cap, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:51 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-pandora-earnings 
-20130822,0,619681.story [http://perma.cc/5YZL-ENDB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014); 
Pandora Removes 40-Hour-Per-Month Limit On Free Mobile Listening, PANDORA 
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://investor.pandora.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1849420&highlight= [http://perma.cc/9J9Z-NE2L] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 55. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 3; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra 
note 5, at 140; Jason Mazzone, The Right to Die Online, 16 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 13 
(2013) [hereinafter Mazzone, The Right to Die Online]. 
 56. Cahn, supra note 29, at 37. 
 57. Businesses use social media, partly because advertising there is less 
expensive. Tarney, supra note 43, at 778. 
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activity.58 This includes sites such as Facebook,59 Google+,60 Twitter,61 
LinkedIn,62 MySpace,63 Instagram,64 and Snapchat,65 as well as 
accounts and avatars created to participate in online games—like 
                                                                                                             
 58. Matt Tatham, For Every Hour Online Americans Spend 16 Minutes on Social 
Networks, EXPERIAN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.experian.com/blogs/marketing-
forward/2013/04/18/for-every-hour-online-americans-spend-16-min utes-on-social-
networks/ [http://perma.cc/4G6X-AYAY] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Another source 
claims that internet users spend almost 20% of their online time on social media sites. 
Hopkins, supra note 4, at 217. 
 59. Although relatively young, this site currently boasts more than one billion 
active monthly users. Newsroom: Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom 
.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/8FFG-NTQ8] 
(archived Mar. 4, 2014). This is one in seven people on the planet. Mazzone, The 
Right to Die Online, supra note 55, at 13. If Facebook were a country, its population 
would be the third largest in the world. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 134. 
 60. As of December 2012, Google+ had 343 million active users. Stephen J. 
Vaughn-Nichols, Google+ Moves up to Second Place in Social Networks, ZDNET 
(Jan. 26, 2013, 9:27 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/google-moves-up-to-second-place-
in-social-networks-7000010372/ [http://perma.cc/9U55-U9TK] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014). Nearly 60% of Google+ users check it daily. Mielach, supra note 4. 
 61. Twitter is a microblogging application allowing users to post no more than 140 
characters at a time. Sherry, supra note 13, at 201−02. It is used by 18% of American 
adults, Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW INTERNET, http://www .pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/5HKK-
MGQV] (archived Mar. 12, 2014), and according to one source, it boasts 200 million 
accounts and 230 million tweets per day. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, 
at 1667. Twitter itself claims to have more than 645 million users. Twitter Statistics, 
STATISTICS BRAIN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/ 
[http://perma.cc/JQH4-C3RT] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 62. This is the largest online professional network with 259 million members, 
Sherry, supra note 13, at 202, 40% of whom check in daily, Mielach, supra note 4. 
LinkedIn itself claims 238 million users. About LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, http://press 
.linkedin.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma.cc/9QK5-X99H] 
(archived Mar. 4, 2014).  
 63. MySpace has 25 million users, John Bowman, Myspace’s $20M Relaunch 
Deletes Its Remaining Users’ Blogs, CBCNEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/newsblogs 
/yourcommunity/2013/06/myspaces-20m-relaunch-deletes-its-remaining-users-blogs 
.html (last updated June 13, 2013) [http://perma.cc/Y7ZG-LFDV] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014), and draws a younger crowd than does Facebook. Sherry, supra note 13, at 201. 
In addition to its social networking function, millions of artists use MySpace’s 
popular music section to post and sell music. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra 
note 41, at 1663. 
 64. Instragram has 150 million users, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/press/ 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2014), 70% of whom log in daily. Mielach, supra note 4. 
 65. Snapchat has more than 8 million American adult users, and more than 200 
million snaps are exchanged per day. Jennifer Van Grove, Snapchat Snapshot: App 
Counts 8M Adult Users in U.S., C|NET (June 25, 2013, 11:54 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57590968-93/snapchat-snapshot-app-counts-8m-
adult-users-in-u.s/ [http://perma.cc/8MXC-92F6] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
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World of Warcraft66 and Entropia Universe—and virtual, three-
dimensional worlds like Second Life.67  
C. Digital Items of a Financial Nature 
Certain digital items offer the ability to manage, spend, or earn 
money and, therefore, can be classified as financial in nature.68 
Accounts in online games are potential financial digital items,69 as are 
online accounts linked to bank accounts, college funds, brokerage 
accounts, retirement plans, credit cards, loans, and insurance 
accounts.70 PayPal and online shopping sites like Amazon71 and eBay72 
are also classified as financial in nature,73 as well as customer rewards 
                                                                                                             
 66. Approximately 8.3 million users play World of Warcraft. Charles Arthur, 
World of Warcraft: Is It Losing the Battle for Subscribers?, GUARDIAN (May 9, 2013, 
10:28 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/shortcuts/2013/may/09/world-of-
warcraft-losing-battle-subscribers [http://perma.cc/BWR6-8FGV] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 67. Second Life has 33 million users. Daniel Voyager, Second Life Statistics 
2013 Spring Update, DANIEL VOYAGER’S BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), http://Daniel 
voyager.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/second-life-statistics-2013-spring-update/ [http: 
//perma.cc/5RQF-K6KT] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). Note, though, that although 
Second Life involves interaction with others and thus could be considered social 
networking, some argue its primary function is a virtual gaming site. Sherry, supra 
note 13, at 234–35. 
 68. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 151–53. 
 69. Though few would expect it, online games can be valuable digital assets that 
generate income. For example, one Second Life landholder, Anshe Chung, has virtual 
real estate holdings valued at more than $1 million. Wu, supra note 10, at 1. 
 70. Nearly half of all adult Americans with access to the Internet pay their bills 
online because of the convenience and independence of doing so. Wilkens, supra note 
23, at 1039. Further, the number of Internet users who conduct financial transactions 
online is increasing in every age group, with the 70- to 75-year-old age group 
responsible for the biggest increase since 2005. Id. at 1055. 
 71. Jessica Kril, Statistics and Facts About Online Shopping, STATISTA: THE 
STATISTICS PORTAL, http://www.statista.com/topics/871/online-shopping/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2013) [http://perma.cc/89VV-XB28] (archived Feb. 24, 2014).  In 2012, 
Amazon reportedly had approximately 182 million active customers. Owen Thomas, 
Amazon Has an Estimated 10 Million Members for Its Surprisingly Profitable Prime 
Club, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com/amazon-prime-10-million-members-morningstar-2013-3 [http://perma 
.cc/DA4N-QHC7] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 72. “eBay is the world’s largest online marketplace, facilitating an estimated 
$2,000 in sales every second.” Sherry, supra note 13, at 204. 
 73. Americans spend about five minutes of every hour shopping online, Tatham, 
supra note 58, and it is predicted that Americans will spend $327 billion on it in 
2016, up from $202 billion in 2011. Goldman & Jamison, supra note 5. It has been 
estimated that nearly 70% of all American Internet users purchased an item online in 
2011. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 216. Some even have “digital wallet” applications on 
their cell phones that let users pay for products from their phones. Hill, supra note 16. 
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programs.74 Likewise, some blogs and domain names qualify as 
financial digital items. While most of the 40 million blogs on the 
Internet75 have little or no financial value, some generate significant 
revenue.76 For example, in November of 2011, the most valuable blog, 
Gawker.com, was valued at $318 million.77 Like blogs, domain names 
can also be quite profitable.78 
As more businesses embrace online life, they too obtain digital 
items that are classified as financial. In some situations, the business 
itself may exist only online, like virtual businesses, online auction 
houses, and eBay sellers. In others, a physical business may have 
digital items because it stores information, such as client lists, customer 
orders and preferences, customer contact information, and employee 
payroll accounts, in digital format. Some business owners, like 
computer programmers, graphic or web designers, photographers, 
authors, musicians, and artists, may sell products that are created or 
                                                                                                             
 74. Many Americans have taken advantage of the plethora of loyalty programs 
like frequent flier, banking rewards, shopping rewards, and many others. One study 
reports that outstanding loyalty points had an estimated total value of $50 billion in 
2011. Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 2. Some may amass a significant 
number of points or miles and die without having spent them. Grant, supra note 13. 
For example, some report members acquiring at least 3.5 trillion in unused miles. 
Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 2. 
 75. Maimes, supra note 14. Many of them are housed on blog host websites like 
WordPress, Blogger, LiveJournal, and TypePad. 
 76. This revenue comes, in large part, from paid advertisements or subscription 
sales. Haller, supra note 13. 
 77. Id. As of 2011, other valuable blogs include: Drudge Report ($93 million), 
Popsugar Media Network ($64 million), SB Nation ($56 million), Macrumors ($52 
million), Business Insider ($45 million), Seeking Alpha ($45 million), Cheezburger 
Nation ($41 million), Mashable ($39 million), and Gigaom ($32 million). The 10 
Most Valuable Blogs in 2011, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/the-10-most-valuable-blogs-in-2011/24 
706/ [http://perma.cc/AT9D-Q6SD] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). “America’s top ten 
most valuable blogs had an estimated aggregate value of $785 million.” Haller, supra 
note 13. 
 78. Domain names are identification strings used to identify the location of a 
particular website and include URLs from sites like GoDaddy.com and Network 
Solutions. Haller, supra note 13. The domain name “Porn.com” sold in 2007 for $9.5 
million; “Insure.com” sold in 2009 for $16 million, and “Sex.com” sold in 2010 for 
$14 million. Beyer, Estate Planning, supra note 10, at 3. But see Haller, supra note 
13 (asserting that “Sex.com” sold for $13 million in 2010 after selling for $14 million 
in 2006). “Hotels.com” sold in 2001 for $11 million. Haworth, supra note 21, at 34. 
See World’s Top 10 Most Expensive Domain Names, MOST EXPENSIVE J., 
http://most-expensive.com/domain-name (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [http://perma 
.cc/LKK2-QYDC] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). A domain name can depreciate quickly, 
and lack of knowledge of a decedent’s ownership of a domain name could cause a 
missed renewal deadline. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 3. Valuable domain 
names can have people “waiting to jump on them when the lease expires.” Marshall, 
supra note 1 (citing estate planning attorney James Lamm). 
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stored in digital form. These digital products may have additional value 
as intellectual property.79 
II. COMPETING INTERESTS TRIGGERED BY A DECEDENT’S DIGITAL 
FOOTPRINT 
Computers and the Internet offer a convenient mode of 
communicating, storing sentimental items, and transacting financial 
affairs during life. However, when a person dies, figuring out what to 
do with his digital footprint is inconvenient for those left behind. A 
decedent’s online activities can muddy estate administration, such that 
successors and others have a strong interest in accessing the decedent’s 
digital footprint. Nevertheless, that interest must be balanced against 
the privacy rights of the decedent and others, which militate against 
access. As one commentator predicted, “The clash between privacy 
laws and estate administration is fast approaching.”80 Meanwhile, the 
important interests of OSPs, which disfavor access, and society, which 
favors access, must also be considered. 
A. Estate Administration Interests 
A decedent’s digital footprint can complicate his estate 
administration for numerous individuals and groups of people. The 
first affected individual is the decedent’s succession representative, 
who faces the tasks of learning of, locating, and (legally) accessing the 
decedent’s digital items. Another affected group is the decedent’s 
successors, who could be forced to deal with the decedent’s identity 
theft and, in some situations, the theft of content of the estate. As if 
these issues, which affect estate administration in all states, are not 
enough, in Louisiana, other people may be affected due to forced 
heirship. The interests of all of these groups of people lean in favor of 
allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint. 
1. Decedent’s Succession Representative  
A decedent’s succession representative faces the daunting task of 
marshaling, inventorying, and distributing the decedent’s assets81 and 
is encouraged to do so as quickly as possible.82 This task proves 
difficult with regard to incorporeal property like digital items, as they 
                                                                                                             
 79. Haller, supra note 13. 
 80. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1055. 
 81. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3191 (2014). 
 82. Id. art. 3197. 
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are harder to learn of, locate, and access.83 Of course, the more 
expansive one’s digital footprint, the more difficult it is to effectively 
administer his estate. Nevertheless, a succession representative bears 
the implicit duties of avoiding wastage and safeguarding against the 
destruction of the decedent’s property.84 
To determine what to do with a decedent’s digital footprint, the 
succession representative must first learn what digital items comprise 
it. If the decedent dies intestate or with a will that is silent as to digital 
items, the succession representative may be unaware of them, which 
will make these items difficult if not impossible to discover.85 After all, 
the succession representative cannot find them “by rifling through a 
desk anymore . . . because they’re online.”86 And, of course, if 
knowledge of a decedent’s digital items lies solely with the decedent, 
that knowledge and the digital items themselves could disappear 
entirely upon his death.87 
Gaining awareness of the decedent’s digital items is only the first 
step; a succession representative must then locate them. The difficulty 
in doing so lies in the fact that people do not typically store their digital 
footprints neatly in one place. Instead, they typically store digital items 
on multiple computers, e-mail accounts, and through other online 
accounts.88 As scholars have aptly noted, “Sorting through a 
deceased’s online life for the important things can be just as daunting 
as cleaning out the house of a hoarder.”89 
                                                                                                             
 83. See LA. CIV. CODE. art. 461 (2014) (“Incorporeals are things that have no 
body, but are comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, 
servitudes, obligations, and right of intellectual property.”). 
 84. Sherry, supra note 13, at 239. 
 85. Haller, supra note 13. 
 86. Kelly Greene, Passing Down Digital Assets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2012, 
8:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904437137045776015 
24091363102.html [http://perma.cc/5BT9-FTQ3] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (quoting 
estate planning attorney William Schmidt). Most people do not print out hard copies 
of their digital items. Martin W. O’Toole, Doing Estate Planning When the Fog Has 
Only Partially Lifted, 2012 WL 191161, at *12. What succession representatives have 
to do is search through decedent’s hard copy papers, collect his mail, look at his 
computer, talk to his family and friends, and look at tax forms, particularly the 1099-
INT. Baldino, supra note 8, at 31. Tax forms may prove less helpful as time passes. 
Already, some tax forms, like the W-2, are moving online, and taxes can be filed 
online. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1047. The 1099-INT may suffer that fate 
eventually. Id. Also, since the 1099-INT is sent in January or February, there may be 
lag time between the death and the receipt of the form. Id. Further, if the account in 
question is not interest-paying, locating it may be even more difficult. Baldino, supra 
note 8, at 31. 
 87. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. 
 88. Id. at 1039, 1046. 
 89. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 2; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra 
note 5, at 139. 
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Once a succession representative learns of and locates the 
decedent’s digital items, he must then access them, which can be 
inordinately difficult for a variety of reasons. First of all, chances are 
that the decedent has protected his digital items with passwords. Likely 
driven by threats to privacy and the possibility of identity theft, most 
people choose complicated passwords, change them frequently, and 
keep them secret.90 The more sophisticated person utilizes different 
usernames, passwords, and security questions for each digital item.91 
The result of all of this self-protection is that many decedents 
inadvertently lock their succession representatives out of their digital 
footprints. 
Even where a decedent has left behind a list of digital items, 
usernames, and passwords, a succession representative may face other 
barriers to access. For example, as will be discussed in Part III, the 
TOS that the decedent agreed to when creating certain digital items 
seemingly bars his succession representative from accessing them, as 
do some federal privacy laws. If the succession representative cannot 
access the decedent’s digital items, then important bills may go unpaid, 
valuable assets may be overlooked, and estate administration may be 
unavoidably delayed.92 If a decedent had set up an automatic online 
bill pay from an online account, the succession representative’s 
inability to access that account may cause its eventual overdraft. 
Ultimately, “[a]s more people leave behind only electronic records, 
it will become increasingly difficult to effectively administer estates.”93 
Without a solution, succession representatives will be forced to rely on 
the judiciary, which is expensive and time-consuming. 
2. Decedent’s Successors 
The lack of guidance regarding a decedent’s digital footprint also 
affects his successors. One possible problem for successors is one of 
timing. If the decedent dies intestate, successors could have to wait a 
significant amount of time for the release of his assets, yet they would 
still be liable for estate debts.94 The timing problem could also 
financially harm a decedent’s business, which could negatively affect 
the estate. 
                                                                                                             
 90. Passwords are typically random, are 8 to 12 characters long, and are changed 
every 90 days. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1046. Online providers discourage the 
sharing of passwords. Walker & Blachly, supra note 19, at 182. 
 91. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1039. The average person has 25 different 
passwords. Rex M. Anderson, Digital Assets in Estates, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2013, at 
44; Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 137. 
 92. Haller, supra note 13. 
 93. Wilkens, supra note 23, at 1041. 
 94. Id. at 1047. 
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Beyond this, successors could be adversely affected by posthumous 
identity theft of the decedent or content theft of certain digital items. 
Identity theft is a growing problem, certainly for the living and maybe 
more so for the deceased.95 Many times, OSPs are simply unaware that 
the decedent has passed away.96 Thus, until authorities update 
databases regarding a new death, digital items linger in “the Internet 
abyss.”97 If a digital item contains sensitive information like credit card 
and bank account numbers, it becomes attractive to a potential identity 
thief,98 who can open new credit cards, apply for jobs, and get 
identification in the name of the deceased.99 Social networking sites are 
no exception and have been described by one commentator as “fresh 
hunting ground for spammers and hackers,”100 especially if the 
decedent stored financial information there.101 The reality is that 
“[h]ackers, spammers, and phishers now troll popular social 
networking sites like Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, choosing 
carefully among the wealth of identities. The deceased are at 
particularly high risk for identity theft; [this is because] they cannot 
monitor the activity on their account or report misuse.”102 
Deceased bloggers also face a similar problem of content theft and 
copyright violations.103 While copyright protection lasts for life plus 70 
years,104 without proper protection of that right, the decedent’s 
protected works could be stolen, which could destroy the value of the 
copyright, an estate asset. The only way to prevent this is to have the 
material removed from the deceased’s blog, but as discussed in Part III, 
doing so is difficult given most of the TOS in place. 
                                                                                                             
 95. Conner, supra note 8, at 321. The Bureau of Justice reported that 11.7 million 
Americans were the victims of identity theft between 2006 and 2008, and the 
resulting financial losses totaled more than $17 billion. Ray, supra note 3, at 587–88. 
More recent sources claim that financial losses caused by identity theft total $56 
billion annually. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 232. 
 96. Conner, supra note 8, at 307. 
 97. Id. at 307. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 2. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra 
note 5, at 139. Hackers can “change, steal, or remove the . . . digital property of the 
decedent.” Ray, supra note 3, at 587. 
 100. Ray, supra note 3, at 588. 
 101. Id. at 587–93. For example, if a decedent uses applications like Facebook 
Connect, which link his profile to other sites that store financial information, “a 
hacker could make purchases using decedent’s account credits, stored credit card 
information, or gift cards from sites like Living Social, Groupon, and Amazon.” Id. at 
592. This could exhaust the estate assets if the decedent’s credit card is still active and 
is equipped with an automatic bill pay function. Id. Similarly, a hacker could take, 
spend, or transfer a decedent’s Facebook Credits. Id. at 593. 
 102. Id. at 585. 
 103. Id. at 593–95. 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
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3. Decedent’s Donees and Their Successors by Gratuitous Title 
in Louisiana 
In addition to a decedent’s succession representative and 
successors, the issue of a decedent’s digital footprint may affect even 
more groups of people in this unique, civil law state because of 
Louisiana’s recognition of forced heirship. Forced heirship is a civil 
law concept codified in Louisiana. It provides that, subject to one 
exception,105 if a decedent has forced heirs, he must reserve a certain 
portion of his estate, i.e., the forced portion, for them.106 Forced heirs 
are children of the decedent who, at the time of the decedent’s death, 
are either (a) under the age of 24 or (b) due to a mental incapacity or 
physical infirmity, permanently incapable of taking care of their 
persons or administering their estates.107 Descendants of more remote 
degrees may represent the decedent’s predeceased child for forced 
heirship purposes where either (a) the predeceased child of the 
decedent, had he lived to the time of decedent’s death, would still be 
under the age of 24 or (b) the child of the predeceased child, because of 
a mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is permanently incapable of 
taking care of his person or administering his estate at the time of the 
decedent’s death.108 Subject to one exception,109 if there are two or 
more forced heirs, the forced portion is one-half of the decedent’s 
estate,110 and each forced heir takes his respective portion called his 
“legitime.”111 If there is only one forced heir, the forced portion and 
that forced heir’s legitime are one-fourth of the estate.112  
In the event that the forced heirs’ legitimes are not satisfied at the 
decedent’s death, these heirs may bring an action for reduction,113 
which allows them to take back from the hands of the decedent’s 
                                                                                                             
 105. The exception to this general rule is disinherison. See generally LA. CIV. 
CODE. arts. 1494, 1500, 1617–1626 (2014). 
 106. Id. art. 1495. The remainder is referred to as the disposable portion. Id. 
 107. Id. art. 1493(A). See id. art. 1493(E) (defining “permanently incapable of 
taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of death of the 
decedent”). 
 108. Id. art. 1493(B), (C). The phrase “permanently incapable of taking care of 
their persons or administering their estates at the time of death of the decedent” is 
defined the same for these forced heirs as it is for first degree descendant forced heirs. 
Id. art. 1493(E). 
 109. See id. art. 1495 (explaining that when the fraction to which a forced heir 
would succeed intestate is smaller, that fraction should be used). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. art. 1494. 
 112. Id. art. 1495. 
 113. Id. art. 1503 (explaining that reduction is the remedy). Others besides the 
forced heirs may have the right to bring an action for reduction. See id. art. 1504 (also 
giving the right to the forced heirs’ heirs or legatees or an assignee of a forced heir or 
his heirs or legatees by express conventional assignment). 
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donees or their successors by gratuitous title114 the inter vivos and 
mortis causa donations115 made by the decedent in the last three years 
of life to the extent necessary to satisfy the legitimes.116 
To determine whether the forced heirs’ legitimes are satisfied and, 
hence, whether they will need to bring an action for reduction, the 
value of all property belonging to the decedent at the time of death, 
including that purportedly divested by the testament, is added 
together.117 From that sum, the estate debts are deducted.118 Then, to 
that number, the value of all property disposed of by the decedent in 
the three years prior to his death is fictitiously added.119 The resulting 
number is called the “active mass,” and it is from the active mass that 
the forced heirs’ forced portion (of one-half or one-fourth) is 
determined.120 
Digital items could affect the decedent’s donees and their 
successors by gratuitous title because such items could subject them to 
a reduction claim by a forced heir. Take, for example, a fictional 
decedent, Mr. X, a widower who dies intestate with one child who 
qualifies as a forced heir, $60,000 in corporeal property121 in his estate, 
and $10,000 in estate debts. Assume also that he had made a $50,000 
cash donation in the past three years to his friend, Ms. A. Thus, his 
active mass is $100,000 ($60,000 in estate assets minus $10,000 in 
estate debts, plus the $50,000 gift to Ms. A). His forced heir is entitled 
to one-fourth of that number, i.e., $25,000. Because Mr. X’s forced 
heir is a first degree descendant, he will inherit all of Mr. X’s property 
under Louisiana’s intestacy laws.122 Moreover, because Mr. X’s 
property at death is corporeal, it will be sufficient to satisfy his forced 
heir’s legitime. Therefore, no action for reduction will be required. 
                                                                                                             
 114. See id. art. 1910 (defining “gratuitous contract”). Thus, a donee’s successor 
by gratuitous title would be one to whom the donee gave the property without 
receiving a return advantage. 
 115. See id. art. 1469 for the definitions of the terms “donation mortis causa” and 
“donation inter vivos.” 
 116. See id. art. 1505(A); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2372 (2005).
Note that some gifts are not subject to reduction. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
1505(C), (D), 1510–1511 (2014). 
 117. Art. 1505(A). 
 118. Id. art. 1505(B). Although the Civil Code article seems to indicate that this 
step should be performed third, as opposed to second, all authorities recognize the 
contrary. See, e.g., KATHRYN V. LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 10:6, in 10 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 320–27 (2d ed. 2009). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1415 
(2014) for a definition of “estate debts.” 
 119. Art. 1505(A). 
 120. In re Succession of Linder, 92 So. 3d 1158, 1166 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 121. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2014) (“Corporeals are things that have a body, 
whether animate or inanimate, and can be felt or touched.”). 
 122. Id. art. 888. 
2014] DIGITAL FOOTPRINT 739 
 
 
 
However, changing the type of property in the hypothetical could 
lead to a different result. Imagine now that Mr. X left behind $10,000 
in corporeal property and $50,000 in digital assets about which no one 
knows. He also left behind $10,000 in estate debts and had made a 
$50,000 cash donation in the past three years to his friend, Ms. A. 
Now, because no one is aware of the digital assets worth $50,000, Mr. 
X’s active mass is $50,000 ($10,000 in estate assets minus $10,000 in 
estate debts, plus the $50,000 gift to Ms. A). His forced heir is entitled 
to one-fourth of that number, i.e., $12,500. Because there are 
insufficient funds in the estate to cover the forced heir’s legitime, he 
will have to assert an action for reduction against Ms. A. 
This hypothetical illustrates that in Louisiana, it is not just the 
succession representative and successors of the decedent who could be 
impacted by a decedent’s digital footprint. In the event that a decedent 
left behind forced heirs and also made donations in the three years 
prior to his death, his digital footprint could be extremely important to 
his donees and their successors by gratuitous title. 
B. Privacy Interests 
In addition to the estate administration considerations, the digital 
footprint issue also calls for a consideration of the privacy rights of 
several groups. After all, digital assets may reveal secrets or hurtful 
information.123 Consider, for example, the teenager who creates an e-
mail account from which he communicates personal details to chosen 
individuals or the adulterer who creates an account for the sole purpose 
of communicating with an extramarital lover.124 As discovery of this 
kind of information may posthumously hurt the decedent’s reputation 
and those left behind, that particular digital item, i.e., the e-mail 
account, may be better left unfound. 
Although in some contexts a person’s privacy rights do not 
continue after death,125 most probably expect that at least certain 
portions of their digital footprint will remain private. Certainly, the 
teenager and adulterer mentioned above have an expectation of privacy 
                                                                                                             
 123. As one commentator noted, “Each of us can think of at least one e-mail that 
we would not want to fall into the wrong hands.” Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-mail? 
Do You Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 397, 399 (2006). A blogger echoed, “Who would get a hold of those 
crazy e-mails or goofball photos, and what could they do with them? . . . Now, just 
who do you trust to see ALL of those e-mails (or to filter them before they are seen)?” 
Conner, supra note 8. 
 124. Tarney, supra note 43, at 782. See also Haller, supra note 13 (also raising the 
issue of a child born out of wedlock). 
 125. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1666; Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 
41, at 1654–55; Sherry, supra note 13, at 211. 
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when creating their password-protected accounts.126 Some have tried to 
negate the privacy interest by pointing out that private letters, diaries, 
and photographs can contain information just as private as digital items 
and yet are still heritable.127 This may be true for digital items stored 
locally, especially those not password-protected. However, this 
argument is unpersuasive with regard to at least some digital items. For 
instance, as one scholar opined with regard to e-mails, “‘[P]eople 
should be able to assume their mail is private, whether they are sending 
it via the Postal Service or an electronic method.’”128 Further, people 
know when they keep corporeal items, like those mentioned above, 
that those things are likely going to be found when they die. The same 
cannot necessarily be said of an e-mail account, the existence of which 
the decedent may have never disclosed to anyone. Additionally, unlike 
traditional letters, many e-mail communications involve a two-way 
capture of information. As such, one must consider the privacy rights 
of the person with whom the decedent was communicating who may 
also want to avoid disclosure of certain information. This could be 
especially important if that person has a confidential relationship with 
the decedent, such as doctor–patient or attorney–client. 
Although e-mail is probably the most notable example, a person 
also has a privacy interest in the content on social networking sites, 
such as the person’s name and image, educational background, 
hometown, contact information, location on certain days at certain 
times, and online posts.129 Although a social networking profile is 
never entirely “private” because this would defeat the entire point of 
social networking, individual users may not want their information 
shared outside of the people with whom they have voluntarily 
connected. In fact, some users may feel even more protective of their 
social networking profiles than they do other digital items because they 
are keeping that profile purposefully separate from their real-world 
personas. Some people use social networking sites to interact with a 
different set of people, show another side of themselves, or say and do 
things in the virtual world that they would not say and do in the real 
world.130 Likewise, other members of the site may have legitimate 
                                                                                                             
 126. Tarney, supra note 43, at 782. 
 127. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s Emails: 
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 281, 313 (2007). 
 128. Atwater, supra note 123, at 405–06 (quoting Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch 
Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the 
“Electronic Sweatshop”, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 144 (1994)). 
 129. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1652–53. 
 130. As one blogger explained: 
We have ‘Internet friends’ and ‘real life friends.’ We have interests that 
we only explore through the Web, and those we never include in any 
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privacy interests. These respective privacy interests weigh against 
allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint. 
Still, those left behind may have legitimate reasons for wanting to 
access the decedent’s digital items, and their interests must be 
considered as well. Digital items can hold content that is extremely 
valuable, sentimentally speaking, to these people. As a cyber-
anthropologist Michaelanne Dye noted, “People tend to go back to 
these pages on anniversaries, birthdays and holidays’ (sic) as a way to 
keep a part of their loved one alive.”131 One commentator noted, 
“Some people create new pages as memorial sites, which serves as an 
emotional outlet. . . . [C]reating a path so that loved ones can walk your 
online trail can help families cope with the loss.”132 
Consider, for example, the parents of 21-year-old Benjamin 
Stassen, who unexpectedly committed suicide.133 The Stassens are 
currently fighting with Facebook and Google for access to Benjamin’s 
accounts, averring that information in these accounts may give insight 
into Benjamin’s last days and provide them with “some understanding, 
maybe some peace.”134 This is but one high-profile example of the 
                                                                                                             
 
status updates. We can be one person offline, and someone else entirely 
on the Web. In many cases, this disconnect is a good thing. . . . [W]hen 
our ‘real-life’ selves become trapped by self-doubt or overbearing peers or 
family members, an anonymous username can do wonders for our inner 
My Little Pony fan. 
Andrew Couts, The Digital Self: Our Online Lives are Our ‘Real’ Lives, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (May 7, 2013), www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/the-digital-self-our-online-
lives-are-our-real-lives/ [http://perma.cc/G7TJ-2FMB] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 131. Gerry W. Beyer, Your Social Media Page Serves as Emotional Outlet After 
You Pass, WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://lawprofessors 
typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2013/08/courtrooms-across-the-nation-are-deciding-
the-fate-of-online-social-media-accounts-for-family-members-who-are-trying-to-ga 
in.html [http://perma.cc/AK2W-HY8R] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 132. Id. See also Carrie Arnold, How to Manage Your Digital Afterlife, SCI. AM. 
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-to-manage-
your-digital-afterlife [http://perma.cc/3ZG6-PD2J] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) 
(discussing the growing evidence that suggests that one’s digital footprint can help 
those left behind grieve and cope); CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 142 
(discussing communal bereavement). 
 133. Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online Accounts 
When You Die?, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://rockcenter.nbc 
news.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-online-
accounts-when-you-die?lite [http://perma.cc/J7PB-ECGY] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 134. Id. Although a local judge issued an order directing Facebook to give the 
Stassen family access to their son’s account, to date, the company has not complied. 
Id. 
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tension between the posthumous privacy rights of the decedent and the 
rights of successors.135 
Nonetheless, family members should be careful in seeking access 
to a decedent’s digital items. As a journalist pointed out in a discussion 
of one family’s experience, “[T]aking hold of [the deceased girl’s] 
digital afterlife forced her family to tread a line between celebrating 
her, and invading her privacy. In the process, her family discovered 
some dark journals [she] clearly meant to conceal. She had passwords 
for a reason.”136 
C. Interests of the OSPs 
Caught in the middle of estate administration issues and privacy 
battles are the OSPs,137 who “need legal stability and certainty to 
design effective services and to craft enforceable contracts.”138 These 
companies are financially incentivized to deny access to a decedent’s 
digital items, as doing otherwise would cost them time and money.139  
Some lack empathy for OSPs, given their substantial revenues and 
superior position to aid a decedent’s succession representative.140 
Those individuals believe that handling decedents’ digital items should 
be part and parcel of an OSP’s business. As one commentator noted, 
“Time and money are foreseeable costs in dealing with the realities of 
                                                                                                             
 135. See also Tracy Sears, Family Wins in Fight Against Internet Giants, on Hand 
When Governor Signs Law, WTVR.COM (Jul. 2, 2013, 1:07 AM), http://wtvr.com/20 
13/07/02/eric-rash-family-and-lawmakers-push-for-laws-against-internet-giants-after-
sons-suicide/ [http://perma.cc/A4V4-KRVZ] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing the 
parents of Eric Rash who, after their son’s suicide at age 15, successfully lobbied for 
legislation in Virginia to allow parents and legal guardians the right to posthumously 
access a minor’s social media accounts); Anne Hobson, The Digital Afterlife, AM. 
SPECTATOR (May 30, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://spectator.org/blog2013/05/30/the-digital-
afterlife-what-hap [http://perma.cc/3Y27-7GDX] (archived Mar. 5, 2014) (detailing the 
plight of Karen Williams, who figured out her deceased son’s Facebook password only 
to see Facebook change it and then take down the account). 
 136. Haworth, supra note 21, at 2 (quoting Geoffrey A. Fowler, Life and Death 
Online: Who Controls a Digital Legacy?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2013, 7:30 AM), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873246772045781882203 
64231346.html) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137. “‘It’s a concern of internet service providers being caught between privacy and 
the meaning of their contracts and being faced with a court order to which there could 
be quite severe penalties if they don’t comply with it.’” Hopper, supra note 133 
(quoting Naomi Cahn, law professor at George Washington University). See also Katy 
Steinmetz, States Seek a Way to Pass On Digital Accounts After You Die, TIME (Jul. 27, 
2013), available at http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/27/states-seek-a-way-to-pass-
on-digital-accounts-after-you-die/ [http://perma.cc/C6Y8-CSXK] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014) (noting that companies are “in a sticky position” for the same reason). 
 138. Tarney, supra note 43, at 793. 
 139. Ray, supra note 3, at 613; Tarney, supra note 43, at 799. 
 140. Ray, supra note 3, at 613. 
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businesses founded on services to individuals, and these costs cannot 
justifiably be passed on to society for the sole purpose of increasing 
profit margins.”141 
However, most OSPs are justifiably nervous about violating privacy 
laws,142 and their businesses may be negatively affected if they earn the 
reputation of disseminating private information.143 Worse, the OSPs 
could be liable if they provide access to or copies of a decedent’s digital 
items to an individual lacking the legal right to get them.144 Further 
restraining the OSPs are their own TOS145 that recognize that a user may 
want to maintain his privacy even posthumously.146 Understandably, 
OSPs lean towards honoring their own TOS and, in most instances, will 
fight to enforce them, invoking their users’ privacy rights.147 
Consider one of the most publicized such stories—that of Justin 
Ellsworth, a U.S. Marine killed in the line of duty in Iraq in 2004.148 
During his tour, Ellsworth communicated with others by e-mail and 
planned to create a scrapbook of all of those communications when he 
returned home.149 Upon his death, Justin’s family decided to honor his 
memory by assembling the scrapbook that he had planned.150 
However, Yahoo! refused to allow them access to his account, citing 
its TOS.151 Eventually, a probate court in Oakland County, Michigan, 
ordered Yahoo! to provide copies of the e-mails.152 Yahoo! has 
proclaimed that in the future, it will continue to adhere to its TOS even 
in the face of requests similar to those of the Ellsworth family. 
Some support the OSPs’ position. As Rebecca Jeschke of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital civil liberties group, 
explained, “I think it’s a good idea for sites not to have a blanket policy 
to hand this stuff over to survivors. This information is private and you 
assume that it’s private, you assume that your Facebook account is 
private, you assume that your email account is private . . . .”153 Others 
disagree, arguing that it is in the best interest of the OSPs to allow 
access after death, as this will encourage increased use of their services 
and greater creativity in that use.154 Ultimately, OSPs seem to be in a 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. 
 142. See infra Part III. 
 143. Tarney, supra note 43, at 794. 
 144. See Ray, supra note 3. 
 145. See infra Part III. 
 146. Hopper, supra note 133. 
 147. Maimes, supra note 14. 
 148. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 12–14. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Hopper, supra note 133. 
 154. Kutler, supra note 10. 
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catch-22 situation. They are vilified as insensitive if they refuse access 
to grieving families, yet they are vilified as inconsistent if they grant 
it.155  
D. Societal Interests 
Rounding out the list of those interested in the digital footprint 
issue is society. Many people save various things in digital format, and 
if they fail to alert others of and provide access to those things, certain 
memories and stories of their lives could be lost forever. This is a loss 
not only for a decedent’s legacy and successors but also for society as a 
whole. Digital items can be “informative snapshots of current society 
for the benefit of future generations and as a means of encouraging 
societal creativity.”156 This is especially true of social networking 
accounts, which may be the principal—and eventually only—source 
for future generations to learn about their predecessors.157 Thus, it is 
predicted that future historians will depend upon digital archives to 
reconstruct the past, and if digital items are inaccessible, historians lose 
valuable pieces of history.158 As one person noted: “Without some type 
of digital asset reform now, we will remain indebted to archeologists in 
the future to tell future generations about the electronic world we live 
in today. Why not make their job easier?”159 Therefore, this interest 
weighs in favor of allowing access to a decedent’s digital footprint. 
III. LEGAL ISSUES 
In addition to potentially affecting the interests of several groups of 
people, a decedent’s digital footprint triggers legal issues in a variety of 
areas of substantive law. All hinge on whether some or all of the digital 
items in a decedent’s digital footprint can be transferred or accessed 
upon death. The first issue is whether digital items are properly 
considered property. After all, if they are not, they are not owned by 
the decedent and are not transferred with the rest of his patrimony at 
                                                                                                             
 155. Tarney, supra note 43. 
 156. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1654. 
 157. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1659. This concept is 
reinforced by the fact that the Library of Congress now archives all public tweets 
because “[i]ndividually tweets might seem insignificant, but viewed in the aggregate, 
they can be a resource for future generations to understand life in the 21st century.” 
Id. at 1660. 
 158. Id. at 1644. 
 159. Comments to the draft Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act from Richard 
and Diane Rash, July 5, 2013, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013jul5_FADA_Comments_ 
Rash.pdf [http://perma.cc/M55Y-W9LX] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
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death. The second issue is whether, in light of the OSPs’ TOS, the 
relevant contract law will prohibit transfer or access. Some TOS, for 
example, preclude the transfer of certain digital items and also bar the 
sharing of passwords. The final issue is whether certain privacy 
statutes, written long before the digital era, will unintentionally do the 
same. 
A. Property/Estate Law 
For many people, transferring their patrimony at death is necessary 
to preserve their assets and provide financially and emotionally for 
future generations. 160 Thus, doing so has historically been a 
fundamental property right.161 Over the years, the definition of 
property has evolved to include more intangible, or incorporeal,162 
assets.163 However, “[m]ost of the estates and property laws go back 
hundreds of years, long before digital life, and yet those old legal 
concepts are now trying to deal with the digital today.”164 And, of 
course, traditional property concepts do not always perfectly align with 
digital items, leading to some confusion and disagreement as to 
whether digital items are even properly considered property.165 If the 
digital item is in fact property, then theoretically, the user owns it and 
can transfer it either during life or at death because “[o]wnership and 
transferability of assets are linked together.”166 However, if the digital 
item is not property, it may not be susceptible of either ownership or 
transfer by the decedent. In the latter scenario, it could not be 
transferred via succession law, even if done so pursuant to a legally 
valid testament. 
Although it may be argued that digital items lacking financial value 
are not property, this argument lacks merit. The monetary value of an 
item is not determinative of its status as property.167 After all, old photo 
                                                                                                             
 160. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 58–59. 
 161. Hopkins, supra note 4, at 210. 
 162. Incorporeal property in a civil law system is, for the most part, equivalent to 
the common law’s intangible property. See, e.g., La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. 
McNamara, 561 So. 2d 712, 717 (La. 1990). 
 163. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1664. 
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albums and recipe books may lack monetary value, but no one 
questions whether they are part of a decedent’s patrimony. Others may 
argue that digital items should not be considered “property” because 
they are not actually owned by the decedent.168 Given the current lack 
of direction on the digital footprint issue in Louisiana and the OSPs’ 
TOS (discussed in further detail below), this position is a valid one 
with respect to at least some digital assets. After all, some TOS provide 
that, upon uploading information to the site, the user transfers 
ownership of that information to the OSP.169 In those situations, 
decedents do not own the digital items (either during life or at death). 
Other TOS provide that digital items are nothing more than licenses 
allowing one to use an OSP’s services,170 and typically, these licenses 
are non-transferrable and expire upon the death of the licensee–user.171 
Thus, in those situations, the digital items are not property susceptible 
of ownership.172 Therefore, even if a decedent leaves behind 
usernames and passwords in a legally valid will (which may also be 
prohibited by the TOS),173 the decedent does not actually legally 
transfer anything. After all, a will cannot transfer something that no 
longer exists. 
On the other hand, other digital items, such as those that constitute 
intellectual property, are properly classified as incorporeal property.174 
For example, copyright law protects original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.175 As such, certain materials 
                                                                                                             
 
person’s patrimony . . . .” A. N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PROPERTY § 3, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 4 (4th ed. 2001). 
 168. Tarney, supra note 43, at 783 (“Commentators have recognized that 
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 169. Conner, supra note 8, at 305. 
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note 19. 
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 172. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1648 (discussing 
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 173. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1648. 
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Elizabeth H. Sillin, Five Estate Planning Tips for Managing Your Digital Assets, 
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ging-your-digital-assets/ [http://perma.cc/NM2J-TAZD] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) 
(noting that things that have been published online should be protected by copyright 
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 175. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
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that a decedent authors, like poems, essays, photographs, videos, 
commentary, and status updates, satisfy the definition of “original 
works of authorship,” and their storage in digital form renders them 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Therefore, such items should 
qualify as intellectual property and be protected by federal copyright 
law by the plain language of the statute.176 And because a copyright is 
properly classified as property, it can (at least theoretically)177 be 
transferred at death through state successions law.178 
B. Contract Law 
Contract law is another area of law that may impact the digital 
footprint issue. In many cases, the contract that a decedent entered into 
when creating certain digital items, i.e., the TOS, precludes access to 
that digital item.179 Some do so by defining a period of inactivity 
beyond which the account is deactivated or deleted.180 Others disallow 
the sharing of passwords and specifically forbid the transfer of the 
account.181 This means that, in many cases, the TOS forbid the 
decedent’s succession representative from accessing or managing the 
decedent’s digital items.182 
Although users are at least theoretically aware of and encouraged 
to read the TOS, many do not do so carefully, if at all.183 Studies show 
that the number of users who “even skim” the TOS “may be about two 
in every one thousand,”184 and only 4% of all online customers actually 
                                                                                                             
 176. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1649 (discussing 
Facebook). 
 177. Although the successors may, via state successions law, own the copyright-
protected material in question, they may not be able to access it or obtain a copy of 
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Also, per the TOS, the OSP may legally destroy the copy, which might be the only 
copy. Id. at 784–85. 
 178. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1649. See also Elizabeth H. 
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may be transferred by operation of a will. Wu, supra note 10, at 4. Some set forth 
procedures that a decedent’s succession representative must follow to get access to 
the deceased user’s account. Baldino, supra note 8, at 30. 
 180. CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7. 
 181. Laise, supra note 27. 
 182. Id.; Haller, supra note 13; Hopper, supra note 133. 
 183. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 141; Maimes, supra note 
14; Kutler, supra note 10, at 1645–46. 
 184. Sherry, supra note 13, at 205. 
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read beyond the “price and product description.”185 Even those who do 
read the TOS may not understand them and are typically in no position 
to bargain for any alternative terms.186 Thus, more often than not, the 
TOS unilaterally dictate the fate of the account, leading some to 
criticize the companies as “[t]rying to be God-like.”187 As one industry 
commentator explained: 
You know, those boxes that pop up with thousands of words of 
tiny text that you never read followed by a box that you are 
required to check that says “I Agree”. Yeah, those. Somewhere 
buried in there is language that likely allows the service provider 
to pretty much dictate whatever they want . . . .188  
Thus, some argue that the TOS are contracts of adhesion and should 
not be enforced.189 Yet, most courts disagree, leaving the OSPs with no 
incentive to change them.190 
All of this poses a significant problem because in most cases, 
although the content of an account clearly belongs to the decedent, the 
OSP’s denial of access leaves the succession representative in a 
difficult position. Even if the succession representative has the log-in 
information and authority of the decedent, accessing the digital item 
may constitute a violation of the TOS, which could leave the estate 
vulnerable to liability.191 
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court will rule the TOS unenforceable. Sherry, supra note 13, at 205. For example, in 
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Penn. 2007), the court 
found parts of Second Life’s TOS unconscionable, as they assumed too much power 
and were unreasonably biased against the user. Kutler, supra note 10, at 1658. 
 191. The danger is that “a court would . . . hold the decedent’s estate bound to the 
terms of the user agreement, in the same way it would hold the decedent while he was 
alive.” Conner, supra note 8, 313. 
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Of course, court orders can trump TOS.192 After all, if an OSP is 
doing business in a jurisdiction and the court orders it to do something, 
it has to comply; if not, it can be held in contempt of court.193 
However, securing such an order is not necessarily an easy task. As 
one author explained, “You’ve got to hire lawyers. It’s time-
consuming. Some people may go to all that trouble and it took forever 
to get the order and by the time they got it, the stuff had been 
destroyed. It’s just an unworkable and very inefficient way of doing 
things.”194 Similarly, another commentator labeled the “tension 
between restrictive contractual agreements and digital development” as 
“a perfect storm.”195 
C. Privacy Statutes 
Even if the items in a decedent’s digital footprint are considered 
property and even if the TOS do not prohibit sharing passwords or 
transferring the digital items, there is still another problem: Certain 
criminal and civil privacy statutes may disallow or impede access to 
the decedent’s digital footprint. 
For example, as one commentator noted, “If you use your late 
mother’s password to log on to her account, you may violate not only 
the provider’s terms of service but also the federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act.”196 This statute, referred to by its acronym CFAA, 
criminalizes the intentional unauthorized access of certain computers.197 
Given that it was enacted in the 1980s before the average American used 
computers or the Internet, Congress probably never intended the CFAA 
to apply to the digital footprint issue.198 Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has proclaimed that violating the TOS on 
certain websites is a federal crime under the CFAA; that said, the DOJ 
has also stated that it has no intent to prosecute what it deems “minor 
violations.”199 Although research reveals no case of prosecution of a 
succession representative for unauthorized access to a decedent’s digital 
footprint under this statute, there is no guarantee that prosecution under 
these circumstances would never happen.200 
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Additionally, the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and 
Transactional Records Access Act (SCA) prohibits certain conduct by 
individuals and the OSP. Section 2701 applies to individuals and 
prohibits them from (1) “intentionally access[ing] without 
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided” and (2) “intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization 
to access that facility.”201 It does not apply to “conduct authorized . . . 
by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or 
intended for that user.”202 The term “authorization” is not defined in 
the SCA, and a violation of this section can lead to imprisonment and 
fines.203 Section 2702 governs OSPs and bars them from knowingly 
divulging the contents of a communication unless disclosure is made 
“to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication” or 
“with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended 
recipient.”204 Of course, consent is impossible to obtain from the 
decedent after death; instead, it would have to have been given before 
death, either via a will or some other juridical act or by conduct in 
forwarding account information.205 Consent is also difficult to obtain 
from the other party if it is a financial institution, given the statutes and 
jurisprudence restricting the institution’s ability to disclose 
information.206 Further, if the OSP’s TOS specifically prohibit the user 
from granting access to others, doing so could be a violation of these 
statutes as being without consent.207 Developing case law indicates a 
willingness on the part of some courts to consider at least some 
communications through some popular digital items to be subject to 
the SCA.208 Violations can subject OSPs to statutory damages 
(including, in some cases, punitive damages), attorneys’ fees, and 
costs.209 
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IV. CURRENT APPROACH 
There is no targeted approach to the digital footprint issue in 
Louisiana because neither the Legislature nor the courts has 
specifically addressed the issue. Thus, the onus is on the individual to 
provide for his digital footprint via estate planning.210 However, some 
claim that “[t]he tools and resources that estate planners and their 
clients have relied on for hundreds of years have become obsolete 
because of technology.”211 There are two versions of an estate plan that 
one can take in planning for his digital footprint: (1) the inventory 
model or (2) the trust model. As discussed in detail in this Part, neither 
is ideal. 
A. Inventory Model 
The first estate planning tool that a decedent could use is an 
inventory. The inventory model has been touted as an easy-to-use, 
inexpensive, portable, easily accessible, and time-saving way to 
preserve assets.212 The inventory model hinges on the decedent’s 
creation of a central inventory of his digital footprint, the location of 
which he then informs someone else. Proponents of this model advise 
those using it to update all of the information in the inventory 
regularly.213 
However, beyond these basics, there is a lack of consensus on best 
practices for this model. Some suggest that people should explain their 
wishes regarding each digital asset (preferably in writing).214 Some 
suggest treating different digital assets differently.215 Other differences 
of opinion arise with regard to where to include the inventory, how to 
provide for access to one’s digital footprint, and where to store the 
inventory. As for where to include the inventory, some suggest 
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incorporating the inventory into a will.216 Others suggest merely 
referencing the inventory in the will.217 Some suggest separate 
documents for the inventory, on the one hand, and the access 
instructions (like the website domain name, usernames, passwords, and 
answers to security questions), on the other.218 Further, others 
recommend separate documents for usernames and passwords.219 As 
for authorizing access to digital assets, many urge people to grant their 
succession representatives access to their digital footprints in their 
wills.220 Others suggest appointing a digital executor, i.e., someone to 
act objectively on behalf of a decedent and ensure the proper transfer 
of his digital assets according to his wishes,221 and some suggest 
granting the digital executor a power of attorney over the accounts.222 
Still others recommend that the decedent authorize his OSPs to 
disclose log-in information to the succession representative.223 Some 
suggest storing the inventory, access information, and instructions in 
different locations, such as on hard copy, locally, or online. Others 
recommend storing them with a trusted person (possibly one’s digital 
executor or attorney), in a safety deposit box, or with a digital afterlife 
company.224 
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Despite its advantages, the inventory approach is theoretically and 
practically limited. Theoretically, the inventory model relies on an 
individual to plan for his digital footprint in advance, so it does not 
address the estate of the decedent who dies leaving behind no 
instructions. Most people do not keep track of their own digital 
footprints while alive, “let alone keep records sufficient to direct 
someone else to posthumously discern the situation.”225 Even if a 
person does grant access to his digital footprint through an inventory 
with usernames and passwords or through a digital afterlife company, 
this is not the same as giving the digital assets themselves. As 
discussed in Part III above, many digital assets are nontransferable 
licenses that expire at death. As a result, a decedent following the 
inventory model is simply granting to someone access to something 
that technically no longer exists upon his death. Further, the decedent 
is, from the grave, potentially violating the TOS and subjecting 
someone else to potential criminal and civil liability under federal 
privacy statutes by following the inventory model. 
The inventory model is also flawed from a practical perspective. It 
is burdensome in that the decedent must remember to update the 
inventory every time he creates a new digital item or changes a 
password. It also requires a tech-savvy succession representative,226 
and if the decedent includes the inventory in his will, that information 
could become public.227 Including it in a will could also get expensive 
if an estate planning attorney is used, given the regular updates needed 
to keep an inventory current.228 On the other hand, if an estate attorney 
is not used, the individual will need a working knowledge of state 
successions law, as this will dictate how he must update the will and, in 
turn, the inventory listed therein.229 Additionally, the security of the 
inventory is worrisome. Even if it is not included in a public document 
like a will, the inventory could be lost if the device on which the file is 
stored is lost or broken.230 Potentially more dangerous is the fact that 
the inventory model entails sharing passwords during life, a practice 
that risks premature access to one’s digital footprint,231 rendering this 
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model counterintuitive to security best practices.232 Those using an 
online password storage service do not wholly ameliorate this issue, as 
this leads to one password becoming extremely powerful.233 Storing 
with an attorney is also uncertain because some attorneys are hesitant 
to agree to this. As one attorney stated, “I don’t want to be responsible 
for storing people’s passwords and access codes . . . . If their account 
gets hacked I have no way of proving it wasn’t somebody on my staff 
who had access to that information.”234  
Those using digital afterlife companies face a whole host of 
additional business, practical, and legal issues. First, the business 
model is questionable. While customers entrust digital afterlife 
companies with usernames and passwords, some criticize the industry 
as disreputable.235 Others question the longevity of such companies,236 
given that their very existence “is dependent upon the whims and 
attention spans of their creators and creditors.”237 Additionally, 
although some extol the security systems of such companies,238 others 
worry about breaches.239 Finally, some of these companies charge fees, 
excluding them as an option for some potential customers. 
Practically speaking, digital afterlife companies leave much to be 
desired. For example, one left behind must know that the decedent had 
an account in the first place; lack of this knowledge would wholly 
defeat the purpose of having an account.240 Also, as with a hard-copy 
inventory, the customer must continually update the information stored 
with the digital afterlife company.241 And some of these companies 
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send out information to beneficiaries if the customer fails to respond to 
an “are you alive” notice, even when it could be that the customer 
simply mistakenly failed to respond.242 
The digital afterlife business model also triggers legal issues. 
Though the creators of digital afterlife companies are diverse in terms 
of education and sophistication, they are typically not estate planners, 
which leads some to criticize the companies for misleading customers 
about the extent and legality of the services offered.243  For example, 
although a person may believe that his account with one of these 
companies will validly transfer his digital footprint at his death, this is 
not true;244 simply providing the information to access a digital 
footprint is not synonymous with actually transferring ownership of the 
digital items in it upon death.245 Registering for a digital afterlife 
account cannot transfer digital items; that can be done only by a valid 
will that satisfies certain form requirements.246 Furthermore, it is 
doubtful whether these companies can even validly provide access to 
digital items, as the very essence of their services violates many 
TOS247 and possibly the statutes discussed in Part III, as well.248 
B. Trust Model 
Another estate planning tool that a decedent could use is the 
creation of a trust. A trust “is the relationship resulting from the 
transfer of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a 
fiduciary for the benefit of another.”249 The trust model is based on the 
notion that a trust and any assets validly in it survive the decedent.250 
One way to utilize this model is for the trust to be the registered user of 
digital items. However, that option would not work for digital items 
already registered to an individual user. Another option, at least with 
regard to transferrable digital items, is for the registered user to transfer 
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the digital items into the trust during his life or, for those transferrable 
digital assets that do not expire at death, upon his death. 
The trust model resolves a major problem of the inventory model 
in that it actually transfers the digital item in question from the 
decedent to his beneficiaries. However, it is not immune from 
theoretical and practical complications. Theoretically, the trust model 
may fail, at least with regard to OSPs that limit ownership and use to 
individuals.251 Even when ownership by an entity is allowed, a trustee 
owner is a somewhat novel solution, which may cause delays in 
processing the decedent’s succession while the OSP reviews unfamiliar 
legal documents and interprets how to apply the various privacy 
laws.252 And just like the inventory model, it fails to address intestate 
successions, relies on advance planning, and requires continual 
updating, all of which are valid concerns. 
The trust model also shares the inventory model’s practical hitch of 
requiring that the decedent have a tech-savvy succession 
representative. Further, if the trust in question is an inter vivos trust, it 
triggers the same dangers of sharing log-in information as the 
inventory model. The trust model also does not resolve the issue of 
transferring those digital items that are nontransferable (during life or 
upon death) per the TOS, nor does it preclude liability under the 
privacy statutes mentioned in Part III. Finally, the trust model has been 
described as “overkill” for those with a small digital footprint.253 
V. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS 
Because estate planning is currently the only option in Louisiana, a 
better resolution to the digital footprint issue is needed. Others have 
offered several potential options, including company policy changes, 
an ad hoc judicial approach, a federal statute, state statutes, or a 
uniform statute. This Section presents an overview of each. 
A. Company Policy Changes 
The easiest solution to the digital footprint issue is for OSPs to 
revise their terms, preferably in a uniform way. Lawyers and leaders of 
the bar are hopeful that discussion among stakeholders will lead, at a 
minimum, to a set of “industry guidelines” and “best practices.”254 
Some commentators have suggested that those best practices should 
allow users the power to designate what will happen to their accounts 
                                                                                                             
 251. Haller, supra note 13. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Beyer & Griffin, supra note 43, at 5. 
 254. Cohen, supra note 11. 
2014] DIGITAL FOOTPRINT 757 
 
 
 
upon death.255 This decision would function in a similar fashion to the 
choices that users make regarding their privacy settings on certain 
online accounts.256 If all of the OSPs did this, then more individuals 
would at least consider the issue.257 The problem, of course, is that 
there is no mechanism to mandate this, leaving businesses free to self-
regulate and consumer advocacy as the sole means of persuasion.258 
Some OSPs have indicated a willingness to respond to such 
persuasion259 and have changed their TOS on their own initiative. The 
most notable of these are the recent changes to Google’s policy. 
Google’s Inactive Account Manager, nicknamed “Google 
Death,”260 allows Google users to pre-designate what will happen to 
their accounts after a certain period of inactivity, ranging from 3 to 12 
months.261 Upon the inactivity period’s expiration and after attempting 
to reach the user via text and secondary e-mail, Google will respect the 
user’s designation to either terminate the account or send the data to 
designated persons.262 
One commentator, Gerry Beyer, applauded Google and urged other 
OSPs to follow its lead.263 He suggested that OSPs provide an “easy 
                                                                                                             
 255. Beyer & Cahn, Digital Planning, supra note 5, at 154; Mazzone, Facebook’s 
Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1677–78. 
 256. Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, supra note 41, at 1677–78. 
 257. See CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 7, at 173. 
 258. Mazzone, The Right to Die Online, supra note 55, at 1. Some believe that 
existing company policies do not protect users. Id. (discussing Facebook). 
 259. Sherry, supra note 13, at 229. For example, after Instagram (a company 
owned by Facebook) tried to change its TOS to give advertisers free access to photos 
stored on their site, users complained such that the company acquiesced and revised 
the TOS again. Haworth, supra note 21, at 23. In September 2013, Facebook 
announced its plans to change its TOS to nearly mirror those in the failed Instagram 
TOS. Nancy Kim, Happy Groundhog Day, Facebook!, CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (Sept. 
13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/09/happy-
groundhogs-day-face book.html [http://perma.cc/4429-3AV3] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014). This announcement garnered protests from users and privacy advocacy 
groups, and six privacy groups wrote to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
complain. Id. The FTC has announced that it will investigate whether Facebook’s 
proposed TOS violate an agreement that the company reached with the FTC in 2011. 
Id. Only time will tell whether Facebook will voluntarily retreat from its proposed 
TOS. 
 260. Will Oremus, Have You Written Your Google Will?, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2013, 
6:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/04/11/google_death_in 
active_account_manager_lets_you_plan_digital_afterlife.html [http://perma.cc/3WRX-
DH6U] (archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 261. Andreas Tuerk, Plan Your Digital Afterlife with Inactive Account Manager, 
GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 11, 2013), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot 
.com/2013/04/plan-your-digital-afterlife-with.html [http://perma.cc/TDW8-HKU5] 
(archived Feb. 24, 2014). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Beyer, supra note 10, at 19. 
758 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
method at the time a person signs up for a new service so the person 
can designate the disposition of the account upon the owner’s . . . 
death.”264 Although this is a preferred solution, “market pressure may 
be insufficient to discipline businesses,” and some smaller OSPs may 
not have the resources to emulate Google’s approach.265 Further, even 
for those OSPs enacting such policies, the scope may be somewhat 
limited because there is no requirement that existing users take 
advantage of the new service. 
B. Ad Hoc Decisions 
Another option is to simply leave this issue for the courts to decide 
on an ad hoc basis. However, this solution is unattractive for two 
reasons. First, such an approach runs counter to one of the basic tenets 
of Louisiana’s civil law system, according to which all sources of law 
are not created equally. The civil law system distinguishes between 
primary and secondary sources of law, and judicial opinions are merely 
a secondary source,266 meaning they are not binding and merely serve 
as persuasive authority.267 As a result, the ad hoc approach could lead 
to inconsistent decisions among different courts and a resulting lack of 
certainty for Louisiana citizens. This, in turn, could make it difficult for 
attorneys to advise their clients. 
Second, ad hoc decisions would be a strain on the judiciary. As 
already mentioned, the number of digital items has grown significantly 
over the years and is expected to continue to do so in the future.268 
Further, more and more Internet users with digital footprints are going 
to continue to die. Thus, this issue is only going to become more 
prevalent and problematic as time passes. Leaving the issue for judicial 
resolution on an ad hoc basis would be burdensome for the court 
system. 
C. Federal Statute 
Some have suggested that a federal statute would remedy the 
digital footprint issue. The Commerce Clause should allow Congress 
the authority to legislate on this topic,269 and this is definitely an 
attractive solution because it would ensure uniformity and foster 
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certainty.270 Given the global nature of the digital footprint issue, a 
federal statute could be a “better and clearer source of ownership 
rights.”271 
However, at this time, there is “little movement” in Congress on 
this issue; actually, one Congressman has called for a moratorium on 
legislation addressing one’s digital footprint.272 Additionally, there is a 
lack of consensus on the appropriate substance of such a statute and 
concern that a federal statute may be politically motivated and, as a 
result, impractical and adopted without close attention to detail.273 
Ultimately, commentators express a lack of faith in Congress’s ability 
to craft a substantively appropriate statute.274 
Further, it is possible that a federal statute could trigger federalism 
problems under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.275 
After all, property and successions are areas of law traditionally 
reserved to the states.276 Depending on the substance of a federal 
statute on a decedent’s digital footprint, it is possible that such a statute 
could impinge on the states’ rights. 
D. State Statutes 
A converse approach could be to allow Louisiana to resolve the 
digital footprint issue in its own way. There has been a recent 
movement toward this in other states,277 and a small number of state 
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legislatures have enacted on-topic statutory provisions, which are 
further discussed in this Section. Such statutes alleviate federalism 
concerns. They also have beneficial provisions that should be 
considered in fashioning a resolution to the digital footprint. As such, 
Louisiana should consider them, but the concerns triggered by them, 
individually and collectively, should prevent the State from adopting 
any of the existing statutory provisions in toto. 
A few state statutes address only e-mail. For example, California’s 
2002 statute requires that e-mail providers give a 30-day notice prior to 
terminating any account.278 It does not provide for anyone to access the 
decedent’s account. Further, the mandated notice may be sent to the e-
mail address in question, and therefore, if the decedent has not left 
behind his username, password, and access instructions, the notice will 
not be seen.279 Connecticut’s and Rhode Island’s statutes also apply 
only to e-mail.280 However, both go further than California’s 
provisions by requiring e-mail service providers to provide a 
decedent’s succession representative with access to or copies of the 
contents of the decedent’s account.281 Before doing so, Connecticut 
requires receipt of either (1) a written request for such access or copies 
by the executor or administrator, a copy of the death certificate, and a 
certified copy of the appointment of the executor or administrator or 
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(2) an order of the probate court having jurisdiction over the decedent’s 
estate.282 The Rhode Island statute requires receipt of both and also 
requires that the order designate the executor or administrator as agent 
for the decedent under the SCA and mandate indemnity by the estate in 
favor of the electronic mail service provider.283 The Connecticut statute 
may run afoul of the SCA because it makes no attempt to comply.284 
Further, under both statutes, the testator’s role is unclear; that is to say, 
there is no direction as to whether a testator can prevent access or 
require the e-mail provider to transmit the e-mails to someone other 
than the succession representative.285 Additionally, the phrase “access 
or copies,” clearly disjunctive, could generate confusion as to who gets 
to decide whether access or copies will be provided, and if the 
succession representative is allowed access, it is not clear exactly what 
the succession representative can do with regard to the account 
thereafter.286 
Other statutes extend their applicability beyond e-mail and provide 
for greater powers to the succession representative. For example, the 
Oklahoma statute allows the succession representative, “where 
otherwise authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or 
terminate any accounts of a deceased person on any social networking 
website, any microblogging or short message service website or any 
email service websites.”287 The language “where otherwise authorized” 
has generated some confusion.288 Some believe that this means the 
decedent would have to specifically provide for access to his 
succession representative before it would be granted, yet most 
decedents die intestate. Idaho’s statute is identical except that it does 
not contain the phrase “where otherwise authorized”; instead, it 
defaults in favor of access yet allows for exceptions to access where 
“restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a formal 
proceeding.”289 It also requires that the succession representative act 
reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons.290 These two 
statutes improve upon others by clarifying the succession 
representative’s authority and allowing the decedent more autonomy.  
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However, these statutes have shortcomings. First, they do not, by 
their terms, require any proof of the decedent’s death. Second, they do 
not allow for a decedent to grant access to someone other than his 
succession representative. Third, they may run afoul of the SCA 
because they make no attempt to comply.291 Fourth, the statutes’ 
specific lists of digital items and lack of definitions could potentially 
limit the statutes’ applicability and quickly render them obsolete as 
technology continues to evolve.292 
Indiana’s legislation is even broader. It applies to any custodian 
who electronically stores documents or other information of another 
person. Additionally, it requires that the succession representative be 
given access to or copies of such stored materials upon receipt of (1) a 
written request for such access or copies by the succession 
representative, a copy of the death certificate, and a certified copy of 
the succession representative’s letters testamentary or (2) an order of 
the probate court having jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate.293 
Although this statute requires proof of the decedent’s death, it is not 
without criticism. First, it is unclear whether a testator can prevent 
access altogether or require the OSP to transmit the material to 
someone other than the succession representative. Second, the statute is 
ambiguous as to who is allowed to decide whether access or copies 
should be provided, and in the event that the succession representative 
is allowed access, it is not clear exactly what he can do with regard to 
the account thereafter. Third, like most of the statutes, the Indiana 
statute may run afoul of the SCA because it makes no attempt to 
comply. Finally, it lacks definitions of the words “documents” and 
“information,” leaving open questions about its applicability.294 
Although an open-ended definition (or lack thereof) allows the law to 
remain relevant for new technologies and new types of digital items, it 
can also create uncertainty and confusion as to which items are 
covered.295 
Nevada has enacted the newest legislation, effective October 1, 
2013. This statute, in the absence of contrary directions in a decedent’s 
will or a court order, authorizes a decedent’s succession representative 
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to direct the termination of the decedent’s accounts, including those on 
social networking, web log service, Microblog service, short message 
service, electronic mail service, or any similar electronic or digital item 
of the decedent, but it does not allow him to terminate any of the 
decedent’s financial accounts.296 This statute is broad, defaults in favor 
of access, and allows a decedent to prevent access. However, it does 
not require any documentation of the decedent’s death, does not allow 
for the decedent to require the OSP to allow access to someone other 
than the succession representative, potentially violates the SCA, and 
most importantly, does not allow for any activity by the succession 
representative, except for termination of the account. 
Beyond the criticisms levied at each individual statute, the 
collective group is subject to several more. First, a state statute may not 
even apply. After all, the TOS usually include a choice-of-law 
provision.297 Thus, where such a provision is respected, it is likely that 
the substantive law of a state with a digital footprint statute will not 
apply. Even if a digital footprint statute is applied in spite of a choice-
of-law provision, some worry that the existing statutes do nothing to 
address the legal issues mentioned in Part III. For example, the statutes 
do not resolve the issue of whether digital items are property, may 
directly conflict with the TOS by allowing a succession representative 
access,298 and do not address privacy statutes.299 
As a practical matter, some criticize the notion of having numerous 
(potentially different) state laws in place, as this could be inefficient 
and costly and could reduce certainty.300 Some have expressed concern 
that by defaulting to access, some of these statutes do not consider the 
wishes of the deceased.301 Some have questioned the statutes’ 
longevity, as they are creatures of the time period in which they were 
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enacted and are limited to technology that existed at that time.302 
Others have criticized them as lagging behind technology and creating 
confusion and unnecessary expense.303 
Ultimately, these statutes are still in their infancy.304 As Professor 
Naomi Cahn noted, “[W]e’re still in the process of testing how those 
laws operate. They don’t cover all Internet accounts and the laws are 
new enough that they’re just in the process of being worked out.”305 One 
commentator has dubbed the statutes “reactionary” and worries that they 
could exacerbate the digital footprint problems.306 Another has 
expressed concern that they are “toothless.”307 Some state legislators 
share this concern, pondering whether such statutes are premature and 
potentially unenforceable.308 
E. Uniform Law 
Touted as the “ideal vehicle” to resolve the digital footprint issue, 
another option is the creation of a uniform law.309 Currently, the 
Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is working on such a law, the 
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (Act).310 This Act is 
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currently in draft form and in the process of possibly becoming a 
uniform law.311 If so, it would grant to certain fiduciaries specified 
authority over another’s digital footprint.312 
More particularly, the Act provides that, if granted authority, a 
decedent’s succession representative steps into the shoes of the 
decedent with regard to his online digital footprint and where the 
succession representative has authority over a decedent’s digital 
device, he may access any record on that device.313 The Act also 
provides that a succession representative has the “lawful consent” of 
the decedent to access his digital footprint and is an “authorized user” 
of the same, language that mirrors that of the federal privacy statutes 
(the CFAA and the SCA) discussed in Part III.314 
As to the succession representative’s scope of power, the Act 
provides two alternatives. Under Alternative A, a succession 
representative would be allowed control over the decedent’s digital 
footprint and have the ability to obtain access to both the records and 
contents of the same unless the decedent provided otherwise in a will 
or a court prohibited this.315 Under Alternative B, a succession 
representative would be allowed to access, manage, deactivate, and 
delete the decedent’s digital footprint unless prohibited from doing so 
by the will of the decedent, a court order, or any other law of the 
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state.316 Finally, the Act grants OSPs immunity for any actions taken 
pursuant to the Act.317 
Proponents believe that the Act will provide guidance to courts and 
solve problems of inefficiency, excessive costs, and uncertainty in the 
outcome when dealing with multiple states’ laws.318 The Act has 
numerous advantages. It extends to all digital property319 and at least 
implicitly requires proof of death.320 It also allows the decedent to 
prevent access (although it requires the decedent to do so via a will, 
denying protection to the intestate decedent or to the decedent whose 
will is invalid). Another benefit of the Act is that it allows the 
succession representative control over the digital property, not just 
access to or copies of it (although there may be some question as to 
what, exactly, “exercise control” means). The indemnity provision is 
also beneficial because it should encourage OSPs to comply.321 
Support for the Act, however, is far from universal, and the 
concerns of critics vary. Some worry about its longevity, noting that it 
will need “constant monitoring and updating” as technology continues 
to evolve.322 It is too limited in that it only grants authority to the 
succession representative. Thus, it precludes decedent autonomy to 
name someone else (or numerous others) as the appropriate person to 
access his digital footprint or specific digital assets within it. Others 
worry that it is too broad, giving “nearly unfettered access” to the 
succession representative, which could violate the privacy of not only 
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the decedent but also the person with whom he communicated.323 
Additionally, although it attempts to resolve the TOS issues by 
providing that the succession representative’s control over a digital 
item would not be a “transfer,” a statute arguably should not be able to, 
after the fact, change the meaning of the TOS that the decedent 
consented to before his death.324 
Finally, although the Act attempts to comply with the CFAA and 
SCA, whether it succeeds in doing so is up for debate. The SCA allows 
the OSP to disclose the contents of an account only with the consent of 
the originator, addressee, or intended recipient,325 and the Act attempts 
to provide that the succession representative has the consent of the 
decedent. Yet, unless the decedent provided this in his will or has 
expressed a preference that his information be shared posthumously, 
this is inaccurate.326 Therefore, the Act should arguably not apply to 
the intestate decedent or to one who did not indicate his preferences.327 
Further, some question whether a court would find a state law 
controlling, given the existing federal statutes.328 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
While the proffered solutions are logical and innovative, an 
appropriate solution to the digital footprint issue begins with the 
realization that the problems triggered by a decedent’s digital footprint 
are many, and the problems, in turn, trigger analyses from a multitude 
of areas of substantive law. As detailed in Part III, the three major legal 
problems triggered by the digital footprint issue are: (1) whether digital 
items are property, (2) the effect of the TOS that the decedent entered 
into before his death, and (3) the effect of privacy statutes. Ultimately, 
there is no quick-fix, and the possible solutions discussed above do not 
address all three major legal problems. However, there is much value 
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to be found in the groundwork that has already been laid by 
commentators, industry experts, state legislatures, and drafters of the 
Act. Cobbling together the most valuable of their contributions and 
adding some unique provisions could lead to a comprehensive action 
plan that may better address the digital footprint issue. After all, “new 
technologies may require new approaches to old problems.”329 The 
digital footprint issue requires a two-front attack: one grounded in both 
federal and state law. 
Federal action is required to address the issues presented by the 
federal privacy statutes, the CFAA and SCA, both of which 
presumably (and probably inadvertently) preclude one from accessing 
a decedent’s digital footprint.330 While some state statutes and the Act 
attempt to comply with these federal statutes, such efforts arguably 
cannot trump an existing federal statute. Therefore, Congress should 
amend the CFAA and SCA to carve out exceptions for state digital 
footprint statutes. That is to say, both federal statutes should be 
amended to specifically provide that one who accesses a decedent’s 
digital footprint in compliance with a state statute will not violate either 
the CFAA or the SCA. As to the CFAA, it could be amended to 
proclaim such action “authorized”; as to the SCA, it could be amended 
to proclaim such action “authorized” and “consented to.” This 
approach would be similar to that of the Act. However, the Act, if 
adopted in a given state, would apply only in that state; amending the 
CFAA and SCA would affect a resolution nationwide and would 
alleviate any federal supremacy concerns. That would resolve one area 
of substantive law problems presented by the digital footprint issue. 
Congress should also take it further. As mentioned in Part V, because a 
decedent’s digital footprint triggers legal issues in the realm of 
property and estate law, resolving the digital footprint issue falls within 
the purview of the states according to the Tenth Amendment. Thus, 
notions of federalism and comity should limit congressional 
willingness to dictate the fate of digital assets. However, some of the 
benefits of a federal statute could be realized if Congress would enact a 
statute recognizing the power and legitimacy of existing state digital 
asset laws and those that may be enacted in the future. 
Federal action is just part of the solution. Once Congress amends 
existing privacy statutes and puts its weight behind state statutes, states 
must then do their part. Louisiana, like other states, needs a digital 
footprint statute, but the content of that statute is “the million dollar 
question.”331 According to Professor Cahn, “If you’re going to be 
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creating a new law that deals with what happens to digital assets when 
someone can no longer manage them, you might as well be as 
comprehensive as possible . . . .”332  
The first thing Louisiana should do in its statute is to ensure that 
the statute will apply even in the face of TOS that contain choice-of-
law provisions. Louisiana already has a tool in place to do this. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3540 provides that the parties’ choice of 
law will be respected “except to the extent that law contravenes the 
public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable 
under Article 3537.”333 That article, in turn, provides for the applicable 
law to be the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously 
impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.334 Given Louisiana’s 
strong interest in the orderly administration of its deceased 
domiciliaries’ estates, it is likely that its law would be applicable under 
article 3537. Thus, Louisiana could amend its conflict-of-laws articles 
to specifically proclaim that applying the law of any other state 
contravenes the state’s public policy when it comes to digital 
footprints.335 
After ascertaining the applicability of its own law on the subject, 
Louisiana should enact a revised statute to govern a decedent’s entire 
digital footprint. Thus, relevant terms should be defined, and the 
resulting definitions should “be broad enough to evolve with online 
innovation and be clear enough for lawyers, online service providers, 
and the general public to understand what is included under the 
definition[s].”336 Louisiana should look to the definitions in the Act as 
a starting point. Under the latest draft, “digital property” is defined as 
“the lawful ownership and management of and rights related to a 
digital account and digital asset.”337 “Digital account,” in turn, is 
defined as “an electronic system for creating, generating, sending, 
receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information to which the 
account holder has access,” and “digital asset” is defined as 
“information created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or 
stored by electronic means on a digital device or system that delivers 
digital information.”338 While these definitions are an excellent first 
step, one of the difficulties in defining terms in a technology-related 
statute is the risk that the definitions chosen will become obsolete in 
short order as technology continues to outpace the law. Therefore, 
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Louisiana should extend these definitions to capture digital items that 
may not yet be popular or may not yet even exist. In that vein, the 
Legislature should consider incorporating catch-all language into the 
definitions. The Nevada and Virginia statutes present viable options: 
“any similar electronic or digital asset” or “other online accounts or 
comparable items as technology develops.”339 While such open-ended 
phrases may be subject to criticism as vague and potentially over-
inclusive, using them would serve the critical purpose of omitting the 
need to constantly amend the statute as technology continues to 
develop. 
After defining the relevant terms, the Louisiana statute should 
clarify the place of one’s digital footprint within the realm of property 
and estate law. As discussed in Part III, typically, if a thing is property, 
it is susceptible of ownership. If it is susceptible of ownership, the 
owner may transfer it during his lifetime or upon his death via will or 
trust. If he fails to do so, the laws of intestate devolution will transfer it 
for him upon his death. However, if the thing in question is not 
property, then it cannot be owned or transferred. As detailed in Part III, 
many digital items are properly classified as licenses by the OSPs’ 
TOS and are not owned or susceptible of transfer by the decedent. 
Therefore, Louisiana should bifurcate the concepts of ownership and 
heritability when it comes to a person’s digital footprint. 
As to ownership, existing state and federal property and intellectual 
property law should be used to determine whether a specific digital 
item is property. Thus, if current law would classify an item as 
property, then its status should not be affected by its storage in digital 
form. For example, a photograph would be considered property 
whether it has been developed and printed or whether it is still stored in 
digital form. Under this approach then, some digital items would 
qualify as property, but others would not. For example, those digital 
items that are, per the TOS, simply licenses would not be classified as 
property. Additionally, digital items should be classified individually, 
such that one digital item may be classified differently than the digital 
item on which it is stored. For example, a picture uploaded onto a 
photo-sharing website would be classified as property under federal 
copyright and state property law, but the account on which it is stored 
would not. 
Using current property law in isolation would affect no change to 
the digital footprint dilemma and would result in some digital items 
dying with the decedent. Thus, laws on the heritability (i.e., 
susceptibility of transfer) of digital items are needed. Obviously, a 
digital item that qualifies as property is heritable. After all, “[t]he right 
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to own and pass on property at death has been a vital property right in 
the U.S. legal system for hundreds of years and should not be 
destroyed by the digital nature of assets.”340 However, even digital 
items not qualifying as property under current law, but instead 
classified as something else (like a license), should be heritable. 
Providing otherwise, as is the case under current law, is unfair. As one 
scholar noted, “[W]hen you die, no one tears down your real life house 
or burns your paper letters, but with virtual worlds and online services, 
the service provider may delete your account, your online house, your 
virtual goods, your electronic files, and your mail.”341 
Of course, providing for the heritability of all digital items violates 
some TOS. However, “boilerplate provisions (often not even read by 
users) should be barred from rewriting probate laws that would 
otherwise govern whether a particular asset is inheritable.”342 
Louisiana already has one piece of legislation in place to aid its efforts. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 7 provides that persons may not, by 
contract, derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public 
interest.343 Louisiana could specify that its digital footprint statute is 
enacted “for the protection of the public interest.” Additionally, 
amending the conflicts articles as suggested above would further 
bolster the status of the Louisiana digital footprint statute. The 
combination of these pronouncements would negate any non-
transferability provisions in TOS by making them void ab initio. Not 
only would this aid in the orderly administration of successions, but 
“[f]rom a business standpoint, supporting transferability upon death 
might lead to more continuous and stronger client relationships.”344 
However, while all digital items should be susceptible of transfer, not 
all digital items should necessarily be transferred in all situations. 
Instead, Louisiana should legislate their fate as follows. 
First, Louisiana should follow the approach employed by 
Oklahoma, Idaho, Nevada, and the Act and respect the wishes of a 
testate decedent by specifying that any provisions in his will addressing 
digital items should be honored. This includes any denial by the 
decedent of access to his digital footprint. Unlike current statutes that 
are silent on the issue, Louisiana should specifically respect the wishes 
of a decedent who grants access to someone other than the executor of 
his will; in fact, Louisiana should respect the designations of different 
persons to access different digital items. Additionally, the decedent 
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should be allowed to provide his wishes in a juridical act other than a 
will. Louisiana is known for its hyper-formal approach to testaments, 
and a decedent leaving instructions for his digital footprint in a will 
risks having his wishes disregarded due to a form problem. That said, 
the law must also protect against unauthorized access to a decedent’s 
digital footprint. Thus, Louisiana’s statute should allow for a 
decedent’s wishes to be contained either in a valid testament or 
juridical act solemnized by a notary who is not granted access to a 
decedent’s digital footprint. 
However, the decedent who dies without planning for his digital 
estate presents bigger challenges. In such a case, the question arises as 
to how the decedent would have wanted his digital footprint handled at 
death, and competing policies must be considered and weighed 
appropriately. As discussed in Part II, whether to allow access to a 
decedent’s digital footprint triggers a variety of interests, some of 
which weigh in favor of and some of which weigh against access. 
Policies such as efficient estate administration, as well as the grieving 
and closure interests of those left behind and societal interests in 
preserving history, suggest that access should be granted. Conversely, 
the privacy rights of the decedent and those with whom he 
communicated and the contractual relationship between the decedent 
and the OSP dictate against access. 
Most of the other statutes addressing the digital footprint issue 
employ a “one-size-fits-all” approach. That is to say, if the statute’s 
requirements are satisfied, it grants access across the board. If the 
statute’s requirements are not satisfied, it denies access across the 
board. Yet, given the variety of existing digital items, access should not 
be granted or denied in blanket fashion because different digital items 
can trigger different combinations of the competing interests to 
different degrees. It would seem that “the reasonable man” may have 
wanted his various digital items treated differently. For example, he 
may have no problem with those left behind accessing his eBay 
account or his online banking account. He may have a big problem 
with those same people accessing and reading all of his e-mails or 
logging in to see everything in his Facebook inbox. Recognizing the 
unique nature of different digital items, Louisiana’s statute should 
tailor its rules on access to the particular digital item in question. 
The statute should begin with a deep-seated respect for the 
decedent’s privacy rights. In order to facilitate those rights, its starting 
point should be a presumption against access to the decedent’s digital 
footprint. However, the statute should also recognize that other 
interests (besides the decedent’s privacy) are triggered by the digital 
footprint situation.345 In order to balance those competing interests, the 
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presumption against access should be a rebuttable one, and the statute 
should allow for an interested person to gain access to a decedent’s 
digital item by showing by clear and convincing evidence that he has 
good cause for access. For example, perhaps a decedent has left behind 
a business, and his customer lists and orders are stored in an online 
document management system. In such a case, his successor to that 
business should be able to show good cause for accessing the digital 
item in question. Or maybe the decedent’s wedding photographs have 
been stored in an online photo site. His spouse should satisfy the good 
cause requirement for wanting to access that particular digital item. 
Adopting a “good cause” standard would allow for some judicial 
flexibility, while requiring clear and convincing evidence of that good 
cause would serve to weed out frivolous requests. 
While this rebuttable presumption model will allow for equitable 
results as to most digital items, the statute should also recognize that it 
may not be the best and most targeted approach for all digital items. 
Instead, two types of digital items should receive different treatment 
under the statute. One of them is e-mail; the other is the digital items 
with monetary value. 
E-mail is a unique digital item that deserves tailored treatment. As 
mentioned in Part I, e-mail serves as the master key to other digital 
items because access to a decedent’s e-mail account could lead to the 
discovery of other digital items. Some of those digital items could be 
things like bank accounts or other assets that stand to increase the value 
of the decedent’s patrimony and, as a result, the value of the 
successors’ inheritance. Thus, if the decedent’s e-mail account would 
reveal the existence of financially valuable assets, the successors have 
a strong interest, from an estate administration standpoint, in accessing 
that e-mail account. Of course, an e-mail account could also contain 
information that could be damaging to the posthumous reputation of 
the decedent and to other people. As such, e-mail is a unique digital 
item that lies at the intersection of two very compelling policies, and 
the Louisiana statute should therefore not subject a decedent’s e-mail 
account to any presumption against or in favor of access. A presumption 
either way would be unfair. Instead, one wanting to know the contents 
of a decedent’s e-mail account should have to petition the court for it. 
However, given the very real and heightened dangers associated with 
the contents of a decedent’s e-mail account, the court should not 
simply grant or deny access to a decedent’s e-mail account. Instead, a 
decedent’s e-mail account should be subject to in camera review in 
which the person reviewing the e-mail account does so solely to look 
for the existence of other digital items. Of course, such a review would 
be time-consuming and administratively burdensome. To ease the 
burden on the judiciary, an independent third party, such as a special 
master or court-appointed attorney, could conduct this review. Of 
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course, that person would be compensated for his time and effort, 
which could be expensive. Therefore, the person petitioning the court 
for the in camera review should be responsible for the costs associated 
with the review.346 Allocating costs this way should discourage people 
from seeking review unless they have a good faith belief that other 
digital items of value (from a financial or sentimental standpoint) will 
be located. 
Digital items with monetary value should also be treated 
differently. For these digital items, the successors have a very strong 
interest in access. This is because digital items with monetary value 
will increase the value of the decedent’s patrimony and, in turn, 
increase the value of the successor’s inheritance. On the contrary, the 
privacy interests are weak. Although it is theoretically possible that 
digital items with monetary value could contain damaging information, 
it is far less likely than in the e-mail situation. Given this balance of 
interests, a presumption against access is inappropriate. Instead, one 
petitioning for access to these digital items should first have to prove 
that the digital item in question does, in fact, have monetary value. 
Assuming that threshold is cleared, anyone opposing access should be 
heard, and the judge should balance the estate administration interests 
against the privacy interests of the decedent. In doing so, he should 
first consider the likelihood that the digital item in question will 
contain any of the decedent’s private information. Given the low risk 
of this, in camera review by an independent third party should not be 
required. The judge should then consider the digital items’ monetary 
value to the successors. Only where he decides that the monetary value 
to the successors is likely to outweigh the privacy interests of the 
decedent and others should he grant access. 
If and when access is granted, the concept of access should be 
clearly delineated in the statute. Thus, Louisiana should not follow the 
approach of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Indiana by providing for 
“access to or copies of” the digital material. Instead, Louisiana should 
follow the approach of Oklahoma, Idaho, and the Act and allow for the 
one accessing a decedent’s digital footprint to be allowed to access, 
control, conduct, continue, manage, deactivate, and delete the account 
in question. In essence, like under the Virginia statute, the 
administrator should be allowed to step into the shoes of the decedent 
and assume the digital item in question. 
The Louisiana statute should also include some procedural 
safeguards. For example, it should contain a provision requiring proof of 
death. Like the statutes in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Virginia, 
Louisiana legislation should require a person seeking a decedent’s 
digital footprint to provide to the OSP a written request, along with (1) a 
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copy of the death certificate and a copy of the decedent’s grant of 
authority to the person requesting or (2) an order of the court of probate 
that, by law, has jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate. It should also 
require that those seeking access to a decedent’s digital footprint do so 
within a specific time frame. This would encourage timely resolution of 
the issue and would also facilitate the speedy resolution of successions. 
The statute should also provide that if access is not sought in a timely 
fashion, the OSP can delete the decedent’s account (as long as it backs it 
up). Finally, like the Rhode Island and Virginia statutes and the Act, the 
Louisiana statute should provide indemnity for OSPs, and similar to the 
Idaho statute, it should impose an obligation of good faith upon anyone 
granted access to a digital asset. 
CONCLUSION 
A decedent’s digital footprint is a topic that is complicated and 
constantly evolving. As the number of available digital items and the 
number of people using them continue to grow, the importance of the 
topic will likewise grow. The topic triggers numerous conflicting 
policies and numerous legal issues in numerous areas of substantive law. 
The current approach, i.e., estate planning, does not fully resolve the 
issues presented—neither do suggested solutions like an ad hoc 
approach, company changes, a federal statute, state statutes, or a uniform 
law. What is needed is the one-two punch of federal and state action. 
Existing federal legislation must be amended to prevent inadvertent 
criminal and civil liability by those left behind. States must then legislate 
the fate of a decedent’s digital footprint. Louisiana’s statute should 
address the conflict-of-laws issues and define the relevant terms in a way 
that will evolve as technology does. It should also bifurcate concepts of 
ownership and heritability, such that the transfer of all digital items is 
possible. That said, the statute should respect a testator’s desire not to 
transfer them and should specifically provide that the statute itself is 
enacted in the public interest, so that OSPs’ TOS will not bar 
transferability. The statute should also comply with any and all testator 
decisions with regard to his digital footprint, but in the event that a 
decedent dies intestate or without instructions, Louisiana should avoid 
the “one-size-fits-all” approach followed in existing legislation. Instead, 
it should consider the strength of interests triggered by different digital 
items and enact legislation that appropriately reflects that consideration 
by treating different digital items differently. In the event that access is 
granted per the statute, it should provide for broad powers. It should also 
demand a proof of death, set time limits, and provide indemnity for the 
OSP. Technology is not going to slow down, but enacting proactive, 
comprehensive legislation such as that recommended in this Article 
would allow Louisiana to avoid being left behind. 
